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Little research has examined how and when children perceive themselves
to be the targets of discrimination, and what effect the perception of
discrimination has on children's development.  Therefore, the primary purpose of
this dissertation was to examine children’s perceptions of gender discrimination,
with a particular focus on (a) the situational, developmental, and individual
factors that predict perceptions of discrimination, and (b) the effects of such
perceptions on self-esteem, motivation, identity, and perceived control.  The
secondary purpose of this dissertation was to examine how different debriefing
protocols following deception affect children’s attitudes toward participation in
research studies.
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First, the theory of mind abilities and gender attitudes of children ages 5 to
11 were assessed.  Next, to assess at what age and under what conditions children
perceive discrimination, children were given mild negative feedback in a
situational context suggesting that discrimination was either likely or unlikely.
Children were then asked to make attributions for negative feedback.  In addition,
children’s social and performance state self-esteem was assessed, as well as their
social and performance perceived control, their motivation to continue with the
task, their identification with the domain, and their perceived valuation of the
domain.
After completion of the measures, the participants were debriefed using
one of two possible procedures.  In the first procedure, the true nature of the study
was explained and discussed.  In the second procedure, the negative feedback was
simply replaced with positive feedback.  Children’s attitudes about participation
and their own abilities were then assessed.
Results concerning how child characteristics (i.e., age, gender),
developmental factors (i.e., theory of mind), and individual factors (i.e., gender
attitudes) predict discrimination attributions are discussed.  In addition, the effects
of discrimination attributions on self-esteem, perceived control, and motivation
are discussed, as well as implications for public policy and future research.
vFinally, the effects of debriefing methodologies on children’s attitudes and
implication for future research involving deception are discussed.
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1CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Many adults have questioned at one time or another whether they were the
targets of discrimination.  For example, an African American man might wonder
if his membership application was denied because of race; a woman might
question whether she was passed over for a promotion because of gender; a deaf
college student might suspect that he did not make the basketball team because of
his disability.  All of these targets of possible discrimination must decide if their
group membership was the cause of their differential treatment.  Further, upon
making an attribution to discrimination, these individuals are likely to experience
important consequences in domains such as self-esteem, perceived control, and
motivation.
Discrimination represents a significant social problem in the United States
and throughout the world.  Thousands of individuals seeking redress to perceived
gender and racial discrimination file lawsuits with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission each year.  Discrimination affects not only adults, but
children as well.  Court cases filed on behalf of children seeking protection under
Title IX, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of
21990  (Office of Civil Rights, US Department of Education, 2000) number in the
thousands each year.  Although existing research has addressed how adults
perceive discrimination, little research has examined how and when children
perceive themselves to be the targets of discrimination, and what effect the
perception of discrimination has on children’s development.
Children’s perceptions of discrimination, and the effects of that perception
on cognition, affect, and behavior, are likely to be qualitatively different than that
of adults.  Children’s developing cognitive abilities are likely to affect when and
how they perceive discrimination.  For example, limits in children’s ability to take
the perspective of others may hinder their ability to understand the motives that
drive discrimination.  In addition, perceiving discrimination may affect children in
ways that are particularly detrimental to development.  For example,
understanding that one is the target of discrimination may affect academic
motivation and performance, self-esteem, and occupational aspirations.
Therefore, the purpose of the this dissertation is to examine (a) at what age
children begin to perceive discrimination, (b) which cognitive abilities are
necessary for that perception, (c) which situational and individual factors affect
children’s perceptions of discrimination, and (d) how self-esteem, motivation, and
perceived control are affected by perceptions of discrimination.
3WHAT IS DISCRIMINATION?
A simple definition states that discrimination “involves harmful actions
towards others because of their … membership in a particular group” (Fishbein,
1996, pg. 7).  Acts of discrimination can range from mild (e.g., ignoring) to severe
(e.g., inflicting physical harm).  Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) point out that there
are differences between prejudice and discrimination.  As they state, “Whereas
prejudice is an attitude, discrimination is a selectively unjustified negative
behavior toward members of the target group… It is important to note that
prejudice does not always lead to discrimination and that discrimination may have
causes other than prejudice” (p. 3).
Despite the simplicity of the definition, discrimination is a complex
phenomenon.  Discrimination is typically subtle and ambiguous.  In the case of
racism, most research has shown that the overt forms of racial bias that
characterized much of U.S. history are not as prevalent today (Gaertner &
Dovidio, 1986).  Instead, overt racism has been replaced with what is referred to
as “aversive racism,” in which people endorse an egalitarian value system, yet
maintain negative racial attitudes (e.g., “If Blacks worked harder, they would
have more money.”).  The same can be said for sexism.  For example, new
conceptions of sexism (e.g., “neosexism,” Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & Joly, 1995,
and “ambivalent sexism,” Fiske & Glick, 1995) reflect the more paternalistic,
4conservative nature of modern sexism (e. g, “Women should be taken care of by
men.”).
Because most people consider outright discrimination unacceptable,
contemporary discrimination is more covert, and hence, difficult for victims to
perceive.  Indeed, the majority of discriminatory actions reported by African
Americans and women are quite subtle (e.g., being stared at or watched; Swim,
Cohen, Hyers, Fitzgerald, & Bylsma, 1997, as cited in Swim, Cohen, & Hyers,
1998).  As Gordon Allport stated,“[discrimination is] practiced chiefly in covert
and indirect ways” (1954, p. 57).
 CHILDREN’S PERCEPTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION
There has been little systematic examination of perceptions of
discrimination in the developmental literature.  There are, however, several
existing studies that bear on the topic.  For example, research conducted in
response to the racial desegregation of schools in the 1970s examined
adolescents’ perceptions of racial discrimination.  In a study of Euro-Americans’
attitudes towards minorities, Radke and Sutherland (1972) asked Euro-American
children, “What are Negroes like?”  They found that 12% of 11- to 12-year-olds,
49% of 13- to 14-year-olds, and 59% of 17- to 18-year-olds mentioned
discrimination.  All respondents described discrimination as negative.
5Researchers have also interviewed targets of discrimination about their
experiences.  Rosenberg (1979), for example, found that a higher percentage of
African American children who attended desegregated junior high schools (51%)
than segregated schools (34%) reported that they had experienced teasing or
exclusion based on their race.  Patchen (1982) found that many African
Americans in newly desegregated high schools complained about the
discriminatory actions of Euro-American teachers.
Correlation research suggests that perceptions of discrimination may affect
adolescents’ academic performance, group attitudes, and social behavior.  For
example, African American students who perceived discrimination had slightly
lower grades and had more negative attitudes toward Euro-Americans than other
African American students (Patchen, 1982).  In addition, African American
students were more likely than Euro-American students to avoid extracurricular
events because of racial composition (i.e., they were less likely to join if the event
was attended primarily by Euro-Americans).
More recently, researchers have investigated children’s broad
conceptualizations of discrimination.  Researchers in the Netherlands, for
example, reported that most children (92%) were knowledgeable about the
definition of discrimination by the age of 10 (Verkuyten, Kinket, & van der
Weilen, 1997).  Name-calling was the most frequently cited example of
6discrimination (cited by 67% of the children), followed by an unequal sharing of
goods (10% of children), and social exclusion (8% of children).  Verkuyten and
colleagues (1997) also found that children did not judge actions to be
discriminatory if they considered the target to be responsible for the negative
behavior, or the perpetrator to have acted unintentionally.
Other researchers have examined children’s understanding of the factors
that produce discrimination and prejudice.  Quintana and Vera (1999), for
example, examined 7- and 12-year-old Mexican American and African American
children’s explanations for ethnic prejudice.  They found that children’s
understanding of prejudice becomes more complex with age.  Seven-year-old
children stated that prejudice occurs because of either (a) an individual’s
perceptual preferences (e.g., “They don’t like their color”), or (b) an individual’s
disliking of a literal, non-social aspect of a person’s ethnicity (e.g., “They may not
like Mexico”).  By 12 years of age, children state that prejudice occurs because of
either (a) an isolated, idiosyncratic social action related to non-perceptual
characteristics of ethnicity (e.g., “Their mom might tell them not to play with
African Americans”), or (b) the pervasive experiential influences of our society
(e.g., “If one [Mexican] did something, it’s like all the Mexicans in the world did
everything bad”).
7Research by Brown and Bigler (2003) has expanded our understanding of
how children perceive discrimination.  In this study, children were read stories in
which a child had received negative feedback compared to an out-group member
(e. g., a girl received a poorer grade on an essay than a boy).  Brown and Bigler
(2003) found that children as young as 5 years old made attributions to
discrimination.  However, older children (ages 9 to 10) were more likely than
younger children to rely on situational information suggesting that discrimination
may have occurred (e.g., being told that the teacher treats boys better than girls)
when making judgments about whether to discrimination has occurred.  Thus,
although young children are aware of discrimination as a social possibility, they
are not as attuned to situational cues as older children.
Brown and Bigler (2003) also found that girls (but not boys) made more
attributions to discrimination when the target of the discrimination was female
than when the target was male.  This finding is consistent with research
examining children’s judgements about peer exclusion (Theimer, Killen, &
Stangor, 2001).  Specifically, elementary school-age girls rate peer exclusion of
girls to be more negative than peer exclusion of boys.  Several researchers have
hypothesized that increased experiences with peer exclusion make girls more
sensitive than boys to such exclusion (Killen & Stangor, 2001; Theimer, et al.,
2001).  It seems possible, however, that girls’ experiences lead them to develop a
8broad awareness of the lower social status of females relative to males.  Girls’
awareness of the lower status of the female role may, in turn, lead them to
develop a higher sensitivity for, and expectation of, discriminatory treatment of
females than of males.
Conclusion
In summary, most research suggests that many children, by 5 to 6 years of
age, are aware that discrimination exists as a social phenomenon.  By 9 years of
age, children are able to make attributions to discrimination (that is targeted to
someone else) that parallel those made by adults.  However, it is still unclear
when and how children personally experience and understand discrimination in
actual social situations.  Do children’s perceptions of discrimination differ when
they are the targets of the discrimination?  In addition, at what age do children
make attributions to discrimination, and what cognitive abilities are required?
COGNITIVE PREREQUISITES TO PERCEIVING DISCRIMINATION
Children’s developing cognitive abilities limit their understanding of many
social phenomena.  Children’s understanding of the world and how others think
about the world become more complex and complete with cognitive maturity.  It
is, therefore, likely that children’s understanding of discrimination follows a
similar developmental trend.  An interesting anecdote reported in the literature
9(Schofield, 1989) points to the somewhat perilous nature of children’s attributions
to discrimination.  Schofield tells a story in which a dark-skinned African
American teacher punishes a young African American girl for breaking a rule.
The girl accuses the teacher of being prejudiced.  The teacher then holds her arm
next to the girl’s to show that they were both African American, but the girl says,
“That don’t matter.  You’re White!” (1989, p. 221).  It is likely that certain
cognitive conceptions will be necessary before children are capable of making
attributions to discrimination.  To understand that discrimination can occur,
children must be able to understand that other individuals have unique cognitions
and intentions, and they must be able to take others’ perspectives.  For example, a
child must be able to understand that another person may hold stereotypical
attitudes that differ from her own, and may act on those attitudes in a
discriminatory manner.  The development of children’s understanding of others’
cognitions is described in the following section.
Children’s Understanding of Others’ Cognitions
Children’s ability to understand that individuals have unique perspectives
and cognitions is broadly referred to in the developmental literature as children’s
developing “theories of mind”  (e.g., Chandler & Carpendale, 1998; Flavell,
1992).  Although researchers in the area have slightly different approaches to their
research questions, most evidence suggests that children gradually acquire the
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ability to infer the perspective of others (Adalbjarnardottir & Selman, 1989;
Flavell, 1992; Selman, 1976, 1980; Selman, Beardslee, Schultz, Krupa, &
Podorefsky, 1986).  Indeed, research has shown that social role-taking ability is
correlated positively with age, r = .80 (Selman & Byrne, 1974).
Young children (prior to age 4) are able to understand that another
individual may hold a different perspective than themselves, but they cannot yet
understand what that perspective may be (e.g., Flavell, 1992; Selman 1976).  In
contrast, 5-year-old children begin to recognize that each person has a unique
psychological perspective, and are beginning to understand exactly what that
perspective is (e.g., Flavell, 1992; Selman, 1976).  Children at this age understand
that individuals who have access to different information may hold different
beliefs from one another (see Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).  For example, a
5-year old child, despite his or her own knowledge, can understand that if Child A
last left her toy in a blue box, and Child B secretly moves the toy to a yellow box,
Child A will still look for her toy in the blue box (referred to as a “false belief”;
Wimmer & Perner, 1983).
By age 5, children can also recognize that people have personal reasons
that direct their choices and actions, and can distinguish between intentional and
unintentional acts.  In addition, children at this age can take their knowledge
about others’ intentions into account when they judge others’ social actions. For
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example, by 5 to 7 years old, children realize that people’s preexisting biases can
affect how they interpret others’ behaviors (Pillow, 1991; Pillow & Weed, 1995).
In addition, children at this age judge an act to be fair if the actor is misinformed
and did not intend to be unfair (Wainryb & Ford, 1998).  In contrast, children
judge the same act to be unfair if the actor intended to be unfair.
 There are some limitations, however, to children’s understanding of
others’ cognitions at this age.  Specifically, children cannot yet distinguish mixed
(i.e., ambivalent) thoughts, opinions, and feelings within the individual (see
Harris, 1989).  As it relates to discrimination, children at this age are not yet able
to understand that others can feel positively about an individual person, yet
negatively about the group to which that person belongs.  In addition, children
younger than 6 cannot yet understand that people may have thoughts and feelings
that are incongruous with their behavior (Gross & Harris, 1988; Harris,
Donnelley, Guz, & Pitt-Watson, 1986).
Older children (beginning around age 7) are able to understand that people
can have multiple, mixed thoughts and feelings (see Harris, 1989), and that those
thoughts may not match their behaviors (Gross & Harris, 1988; Harris et al.,
1986).  Children at age 7 can now recognize that others think and feel differently
based on their own value systems, and begin to understand the interpretative
nature of cognitions (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996).  In other words, children at
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this age understand that others can interpret the same event in multiple and
differing ways.  Also, children at this age can understand that the different
interpretations can be equally legitimate, because events are often ambiguous.  As
it relates to understanding discrimination, a child at this age can understand that
two individuals can interpret an ambiguous piece of information, such as girls’
poorer performance on math tasks, in multiple ways.  Although one person may
interpret girls’ poor performance as being due to test bias, another person may
interpret it as being due to the lower ability of girls.  The latter (but not the
former) might discriminate against girls when picking students for the math team.
Once children have acquired the ability to understand that others’ (and their own)
thoughts are constructive in nature, they are said to have an “interpretative theory
of mind”  (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996).
Some research suggests that children’s understanding of others’ cognitions
may predict their understanding of discrimination.  For example, most children
are able to understand that others may hold false beliefs by 4 to 5 years of age
(Wellman, et al., 2001).  However, children who develop early competencies in
understanding others’ false beliefs are later more sensitive to what others think
about them, and are more likely to report difficulties with teachers and peers, than
those children without early competencies at such skills (Dunn, 1995).  Thus,
children’s early social understanding appears to predict their sensitivity to how
13
others view them, and therefore may also predict children’s sensitivity and
attributions to self-directed discrimination.  Research has also shown that social
perspective-taking is positively correlated with children’s explanations of ethnic
prejudice, in that children who better understand others’ perspectives give slightly
more advanced explanations of prejudice (Ybarra, 2000).  
Unfortunately, no existing research has directly examined how children’s
developing theory of mind is related to their understanding of discrimination.
Therefore, the present study will assess whether children’s interpretive theory of
mind development predicts children’s attributions to discrimination.
FACTORS AFFECTING PERCEPTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION
 Research has examined the conditions under which individuals perceive
themselves to be the targets of discrimination.  The variables associated with
perceptions of discrimination can be classified into two categories: situational
factors, or conditions that change across time, and individual factors, which are
stable across time and environments.
Situational Factors Affecting Perceptions of Discrimination
Two situational variables may affect children’s attributions to
discrimination (see Table 1).  The first situational factor that may affect children’s
attributions to discrimination is the target of the bias (i.e., whether the self or
14
another individual is the victim of discriminatory actions).  A robust finding
within the adult social psychological literature is that stigmatized group members
are more likely to state that their group has been the target of discrimination than
that they themselves have been the target (e.g., Crosby, 1984; Moghaddam,
Stolkin, & Hutcheson, 1997).  This discrepancy is referred to as the
personal/group discrimination discrepancy (PGDD), and involves people denying
personal discrimination (as opposed to exaggerating group discrimination; Major,
Quinton, McCoy, & Schmader, 2000).  Crosby first used this term when she
discovered that women recognized that other working women were discriminated
against in the workplace, yet stated that they themselves were not (Crosby, 1984).
It has been hypothesized that the personal/group discrimination
discrepancy is due to either (a) the greater complexity of knowledge about the self
versus others (e.g., when thinking about personal discrimination, individuals have
a wealth of complex information and it, therefore, is easy to find alternative
reasons for negative outcomes) or  (b) the heavy psychological costs associated
with being the personal target of discrimination (Quinn, Roese, Pennington, &
Olson, 1999).  It is predicted that children, like adults, will be less likely to make
an attribution to discrimination if the discrimination is self-directed than if it is
directed at others.  Therefore, because previous research examined children’s
perceptions of other-directed discrimination (Brown & Bigler, 2003), the present
15
study will examine children’s attributions to discrimination that is directed at the
self.
Table 1. Situational Factors That Increase Perceptions of Discrimination
Situational
Factors
Hypothesis
Target of bias Individuals are more likely to perceive
discrimination when it is directed toward other
individuals (or their group) than toward themselves.
Situational
ambiguity
• Known
characteristics of
evaluator
• Availability of a
comparison group
• Individuals who know their evaluator is (a) aware
of their group membership and (b) biased against
their group are more likely to perceive
discrimination.
• Individuals who are told that another in-group
member also received negative feedback are more
likely to perceive discrimination.
A second factor that may affect children’s attributions to discrimination is
situational ambiguity.  Social psychological research with adults has found that
individuals are more likely to make an attribution to discrimination when
discriminatory situations are unambiguous than when situations are high in
ambiguity (e.g., Dion, 1975; Feldman Barrett & Swim, 1998).  This conclusion
stems from research in which situational ambiguity is experimentally
manipulated.  One manipulation used in the adult literature involves giving
16
participants knowledge of certain evaluator characteristics, such as their potential
to be biased.
In one of the first studies of perceived discrimination, Dion and Earn
(1975) examined how knowledge of certain evaluator characteristics affected
adults’ attributions to discrimination.  Specifically, they provided Jewish men
with negative feedback from people that the participants were told were (a)
Christians who were aware that the participant was Jewish, or (b) Christians who
were unaware of the participants’ religious affiliation (Dion & Earn, 1975; for a
similar study with women, see Dion, 1975).  When asked why they had received
negative feedback, 71% of those who had been told they were interacting with
Christians who knew they were Jewish mentioned their group membership as the
reason.  When no religious information was given (and thus, situational ambiguity
was higher), no one made an attribution to discrimination based on religious
group membership.
More recent research indicates that perceiving a possible discriminator as
prejudiced increases the likelihood of making a discrimination attribution
(Feldman Barrett & Swim, 1998). For example, men are more likely to be
considered prejudiced, and thus are more likely to be labeled as discriminators,
than are women (Baron, Burgess, & Kao, 1991).
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New findings suggest that children also use information about the
evaluator’s past biases when making attributions to discrimination.  Brown and
Bigler (2003) found that 7- to 10-year old children are more likely to make an
attribution to discrimination when they are told that the evaluator (e.g., teacher)
has a history of showing bias toward one gender group than when they are given
no information about the evaluator’s biases (or when they are told that the
evaluator has a history of fairness).  In contrast, 5- to 6-year old children do not
use situational information when making attributions to discrimination, perhaps
because their limited cognitive abilities reduce their ability to attend to complex
social cues.  Therefore, it is predicted that children (with the requisite cognitive
development) will make more attributions to discrimination when they have
knowledge of certain evaluator characteristics, such as the evaluator’s gender and
potential bias, than when they have no such knowledge.
A second manner in which situational ambiguity has been manipulated
within the adult social psychological literature involves making a comparison
group member available to the participant.  The availability of a comparison
group member appears to reduce situational ambiguity, and subsequently increase
individuals’ attributions to discrimination.  Research has found that participants
who make either (a) an in-group lateral comparison, in which one compares
oneself to another person in a stigmatized group who received a similar outcome,
18
and/or (b) an out-group upward comparison, in which one compares oneself to a
person in a higher status group with a more positive outcome, are more likely to
make an attribution to discrimination than participants with no such comparison
opportunity (Swim, et al., 1998).
Children’s attributions to discrimination may be affected by the
availability of a relevant comparison group as well.  For children in a school
setting, these comparisons are readily available and children may be especially
likely to compare their outcome to that of others. 1  Therefore, the present study,
as a means of affecting situational ambiguity, will include an out-group
comparison peer with whom the child can compare him or herself.
Individual Factors Affecting Perceptions of Discrimination
In addition to situational variables, there are several individual variables
that have been shown to affect individuals’ perceptions of discrimination (see
Table 2). One variable that has been shown, in the adult social psychological
literature, to affect perceptions of discrimination is individuals’ knowledge about
prejudice, such as their belief about how often they or their group have been
discriminated against in the past (Feldman Barrett & Swim, 1998; Swim, et al.
1998).  Swim et al. (1998) found, for example, that women who were
knowledgeable about past gender discrimination cases were more likely to
attribute negative feedback to discrimination than women who were not
19
knowledgeable about such cases.  These beliefs about discrimination can come
from one’s own and others’ experiences.
Table 2. Individual Factors That Increase Perceptions of Discrimination
Individual
Factors
Hypothesis
Knowledge  about
prejudice
Individuals who know about past prejudice are
more likely to perceive discrimination.
Group identity Individuals who are strongly identified with their
group are more likely to perceive discrimination.
Stigma
consciousness
Individuals who are highly aware of the stigma
associated with their group are more likely to
perceive discrimination.
Group attitudes Individuals who hold egalitarian attitudes are more
likely to perceive discrimination.
A second factor that affects adults’ perceptions of discrimination is group
identity.  Research has shown that the strength of an individual’s group identity
predicts the likelihood of him or her making an attribution to discrimination.
Specifically, a stigmatized group member with a strong group identity is more
likely to attribute an ambiguous situation to discrimination than a stigmatized
group member with a weak group identity (Shelton & Sellers, 2000).  In fact, the
more highly identified a person is with his or her group, the more discrimination
attributions he or she makes (Major, et al., 1996).
A third factor that has been found to affect adults’ perceptions of
discrimination is stigma consciousness, or the awareness of being in a stigmatized
20
group which encounters discrimination (Pinel, 1999).  Pinel (1999) found that
women low in stigma consciousness  (e.g., answered no to “Most men have a
problem viewing women as equals”) are more likely to say that sexism is no
longer a problem than women high in stigma consciousness.  In contrast, women
who are high in stigma consciousness perceive more gender discrimination
directed toward women as a group (e.g., “Women as a group are often
discriminated against”), toward the average woman (e.g., “The average woman is
often discriminated against”), and toward themselves (e.g., “As a woman, I am
often discriminated against”) than women who are low in stigma consciousness.
A fourth factor that has been found to affect perceptions of discrimination
concerns individuals’ group attitudes.  More specifically, research has revealed
that group attitudes predict the likelihood that stigmatized group members will
label an event discriminatory (e.g., Mazur & Percival, 1989; Swim & Cohen,
1996).  For example, several studies have found that women who hold traditional
attitudes about gender roles are less likely to label an event as sexist than women
who hold egalitarian attitudes (Jensen & Gutek, 1982; Swim & Cohen, 1996). In
addition, Chaterjee and McCarrey (1989) compared the extent to which women in
traditional and nontraditional training programs believe that women in
predominately male jobs experience discrimination.  They found that, across both
training groups, women with egalitarian attitudes perceived more discrimination
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than women with traditional attitudes.  Because children have well-established
attitudes about their groups (but have not yet developed a mature group identity or
stigma consciousness), it is this last factor, individuals’ group attitudes, that will
be examined in the present study.
Children’s group attitudes
It is predicted that children’s attitudes about gender will moderate the age
and frequency with which children make attributions to discrimination.
Specifically, it is predicted that children who endorse egalitarian attitudes about
gender will make attributions to discrimination at an earlier age, and with greater
frequency, than children who endorse more stereotypical attitudes about gender.
For example, if a girl notices that her teacher gives girls poorer grades than boys
on math assignments and she endorses the view that boys and girls show
equivalent mathematical abilities, she is more likely to make an attribution to
discrimination than ability.  In contrast, if a girl endorses the view that boys are
better than girls at math, she is likely to make an attribution to lack of math
ability, rather than discrimination.
Children’s attitudes about their social groups have been shown to affect
numerous cognitive processes.  For example, children’s level of stereotyping
affects their information-processing, including their memory for stereotype -
consistent versus stereotype-inconsistent information.  Children with more
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egalitarian attitudes have better memory for stereotype-inconsistent information
than children with less egalitarian attitudes (Bigler & Liben, 1992, 1993; Carter &
Levy, 1988; Martin & Halverson, 1983; Signorella, 1987).
Children’s attitudes about their group also affect their attention to cues
related to their group membership.  For example, children with highly biased
racial attitudes judged racial cues as more salient than other children.  Research
found that highly-prejudiced children attend more to the race of individuals in
pictures than other distinguishing features (such as eyeglasses and smile),
especially if the child is Euro-American and the picture is that of an African
American child (Katz, Sohn, & Zalk, 1975).
Recently, research has shown that children’s gender attitudes do, indeed,
affect their attributions to discrimination.  Brown and Bigler (2003) found that
children with more egalitarian gender attitudes (i.e., endorse more activities as
being appropriate for both girls and boys) make more attributions to
discrimination than children with less egalitarian attitudes – at least when the
discrimination is directed toward others.  This finding parallels the adult literature
(Swim & Cohen, 1996).  Research has not examined, however, whether children
with more egalitarian attitudes make more attributions to self-directed
discrimination than children with less egalitarian attitudes.  Therefore, the present
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study will examine whether children’s group attitudes are related to their
attributions to self-directed discrimination.      
CONSEQUENCES OF DISCRIMINATION
As Gordon Allport eloquently stated almost 50 years ago, “One’s
reputation, whether false or true, cannot be hammered, hammered, hammered,
into one’s head without doing something to one’s character” (Allport, 1954, p.
142).  In other words, repeated experiences of being negatively judged because of
one’s group membership will undoubtedly have effects on the targets of that
discrimination.  Thus, in addition to understanding the conditions under which
adults and children perceive discrimination, it is important to understand the
consequences of this perception on its targets.  Unfortunately, there is little direct
evidence concerning the effects of perceiving discrimination.  Most of the
research has examined how adults’ self-esteem is affected by attributing negative
feedback to discrimination (e.g., Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991).  In this
section, the research on adults’ self-esteem will be described, followed by the
existing adult research on how discrimination affects motivation, identification,
and perceived control.  To date, no known research has directly studied how these
domains are affected by children’s perceptions of discrimination.
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Self-esteem
Historically, most researchers assumed that having the knowledge that
others may treat you poorly because of your race or gender leads to reduced self-
esteem.  Crocker and Major (1989) outline three distinct theoretical perspectives
that predict stigmatized group members should have lower self-esteem than non-
stigmatized group members.  First, the importance of reflective appraisals for self-
concept (Cooley, 1956) suggests that an awareness of others’ stereotypes,
prejudice, and discrimination should lead to lower self-esteem.  Second, the
existence of self-fulfilling prophecy effects (see Darley & Fazio, 1980) predicts
that stigmatized individuals should come to see themselves – and behave – in a
consistent manner with negative stereotypes and treatment.  Third, efficacy-based
perspectives on self-esteem (e.g., Gecas & Schwable, 1983) predict that
stigmatized group members’ low perceived control over the environment should
lead to low self-esteem.
It appears, however, that perceiving discrimination neither enhances nor
diminishes trait self-esteem.  In other words, when stigmatized group members
make an attribution to discrimination, their global sense of self-worth is not
affected (Dion, 1975; Crocker, et al., 1991).  Indeed, research has consistently
shown that stigmatized group members do not have lower global self-esteem than
others.  Specifically, African Americans do not have lower global self-esteem
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than Euro-Americans (e.g., Taylor & Walsh, 1979) and women and girls do not
have lower global self-esteem than men and boys (e.g., Maccoby & Jacklin,
1974).
Several strategies have been suggested to explain how adult members of
stigmatized groups maintain their global self-esteem, including individuals (a)
comparing themselves to other in-group members, instead of non-stigmatized out-
group members, (b) relatively devaluing the criteria that their group is
discriminated on (or overvaluing attributes their group excels at), and/or (c)
discounting negative feedback as discrimination (Crocker & Major, 1989).  These
strategies are difficult, however, for targets of discrimination to use.  For example,
individuals who have no in-group members present (i.e., have solo status) are not
able to make in-group comparisons.  Also, the inability to completely devalue a
criterion (e.g., academic performance) makes this strategy especially difficult for
students (Crocker & Major, 1989). In addition, most research (as described
earlier) reveals that adults rarely discount feedback as discrimination (i.e., they do
so only when discrimination is overt and unambiguous; Feldman Barrett & Swim,
1998).
Instead, research suggests that adults are more likely to maintain their
global self-esteem by disengaging their self-esteem from the outcome of a
particularly threatening situation (e.g., Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998).
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Disengagement is defined as a “defensive detachment of self-esteem from
outcomes in a particular domain, such that feelings of self-worth are not
dependent on successes or failures in that domain” (Major, Spencer, Schmader,
Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998, p. 35).  This often means that targets of discrimination
will disengage their self-esteem from their performance in academic domains (i.e.
their self-esteem will not be negatively affected by poor feedback about their
performance in a particular domain).  For example, African American students’
self-esteem was higher after failure on an intelligence test than Euro-American
students if the test was described as racially unfair.  In other words, African
Americans had more disengagement of self-esteem after feedback than did Euro-
Americans (Major et al., 1998).  Thus, although discrimination does not lower
global self-esteem, it does lead the target of discrimination to limit the domains
that are tied to self-esteem.
Trait versus state self-esteem
Most of the research examining the self-esteem of stigmatized group
members has measured participants’ trait self-esteem (i.e., a global, stable sense
of self-worth).  This research has largely ignored the complexities of self-esteem.
Specifically, it has ignored that, in addition to global, stable self-esteem, there is a
short-term, domain-specific self-esteem that is more responsive to negative
feedback – namely, state self-esteem.  Research has shown that, although trait
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self-esteem is unaffected by attributions to discrimination, state self-esteem is
affected (Crocker, Cornwell, & Major, 1993).  In other words, when individuals
attribute negative feedback to discrimination in the laboratory, their global, trait
self-esteem is unchanged, but their state self-esteem decreases (Crocker et al.,
1993).  It appears that one instance of discrimination in the laboratory is powerful
enough to reduce state self-esteem.  Perhaps, over time, with repeated attributions
to discrimination and thus, repeated blows to state self-esteem, stigmatized
individuals begin to disengage their trait self-esteem from the domain so that their
global sense of self-worth is protected.
Multiple domains of self-esteem
An additional complexity of self-esteem that is rarely examined involves
the multiple domains of individuals’ self-esteem.  Although the list may not be
exhaustive, Heatherton and Polivy (1991) identify three domains of state self-
esteem that seem to be particularly important to people: performance, social
acceptance, and appearance.  Attributions to discrimination may differentially
affect the different domains of state self-esteem, depending on the domain
targeted by the negative feedback.  For example, Crocker et al. (1993) found that
obese women who attributed negative feedback (i.e., not being asked on a date) to
the legitimate concerns about their weight, instead of the stereotypical attitudes of
their evaluators, suffered decreases in their appearance state self-esteem, but not
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their social and performance self-esteem.  When the women made attributions to
discrimination, however, their appearance state self-esteem was maintained.
It is predicted, therefore, that individuals who attribute negative feedback
about their work to poor performance, instead of discrimination, may suffer
decreases in the performance state self-esteem.  In contrast, those individuals who
attribute negative feedback to discrimination, instead of poor performance, may
protect (or boost) their performance state self-esteem.  Although attributions to
discrimination may preserve performance and appearance state self-esteem, social
self-esteem may suffer when an individual states that he or she is being treated
poorly because of his or her gender.  The present study, therefore, will examine
how performance and social state self-esteem are affected by attributions to
discrimination.
Motivation and Identification
Research has shown that perceptions of discrimination can also affect
targets’ motivation as it relates to academic performance.  When Cohen, Steele,
and Ross (1999) gave college students negative feedback about their writing,
African American participants perceived the feedback to be more biased than
Euro-American participants.  The African American participants also had a
decrease in motivation to rewrite the paper.  However, when the feedback was
accompanied by assurances that the student was being held to a high standard and
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was capable of meeting those high standards, the African American participants
did not perceive bias.  In fact, they had higher motivation and were more
identified with writing than the Euro-American participants (Cohen, et al., 1999).
Thus, it appears that making an attribution to discrimination reduces an
individual’s motivation to achieve, as well as his or her identification with a
particular domain.
In addition to personal motivation and identification, perceptions of
discrimination may also affect how important the individual considers the domain
to be in general.  Although not studying discrimination per se, Major and
colleagues (Major, Sciacchitano, & Crocker, 1993) found that, when individuals
compared unfavorably (based on an experimental manipulation) to out-group
members on a verbal-spatial task (as they would if they experienced
discrimination), those individuals rated verbal-spatial ability as less important
than those individuals who compared unfavorably to in-group members.  Thus,
perceiving discrimination in a particular domain may lead an individual to
devalue (to a degree) that domain.  Therefore, the present study will examine how
motivation, identification with a domain, and importance of that domain is
affected by attributions to discrimination.
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Perceived Control
In addition to self-esteem, perceived control, or the belief that one can
control the personal outcomes in one’s life, is an important aspect of
psychological functioning (e.g., Larson, 1989; Thompson & Spacapan, 1991).  In
fact, perceiving control over one’s life is associated with better emotional health
(Larson, 1989), better coping (Taylor, Lichtman, & Wood, 1984), and better
performance on complex tasks (Glass & Singer, 1972).  Although perceived
control is important to healthy psychological functioning, attributions to
discrimination may adversely affect this feeling of control.
Glass and Singer (1972) were among the first to suggest that individuals
may perceive a lack of control as a result of discrimination.  Later, Crocker and
Major (1993) theorized that, although attributions to discrimination may allow an
individual to maintain his or her self-esteem, those attributions may lead that
individual to feel less control over his or her life, particularly in the performance
and social domains.  In other words, if individuals think that their negative
feedback is due to something out of their control (i.e., due to the stereotypical
attitudes and actions of another person), then they may feel that they do not
control the outcomes in their life.  Thus, they may show a reduction in social
perceived control (i.e., feel that they cannot control how people interact with
them) and performance perceived control (i.e., feel that they cannot control how
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well their performance is evaluated).  Unfortunately, the research on this issue is
unclear.   Therefore, the present study will examine how perceived control over
the performance and social domains is affected by attributions to discrimination.
Conclusion
Research with adults suggests that making an attribution to discrimination
may lead to high performance state self-esteem, but low social state self-esteem,
motivation and identification, and perceived control.  However, these constructs
have not yet been examined in children.  The present study will examine,
therefore, how these domains are affected when children make attributions to
discrimination.
DEBRIEFING METHODOLOGIES
In addition to assessing children’s understanding of discrimination, the
present study has a second purpose.  Specifically, this study will assess the effects
of research involving deception, and the subsequent debriefing methodologies, on
children’s attitudes about research and themselves.
Developmental researchers are cautioned about the use of deception in
research involving children (e.g., Cooke, 1982).  Many argue that research that
involves deception, especially research with children, may have potentially
negative consequences.  Specifically, children may believe and internalize the
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false feedback reported to them as part of the research, even if they understand
deception and are told the feedback is false.  In addition, children may mistrust
subsequent researchers and be wary about further scientific participation.
Indeed, many developmental researchers abide by the caution to avoid
deception.  This is illustrated by a review of the past two years of studies
published in Child Development showing that only 7% of developmental research
involves deception or false feedback.  In contrast, 58% of adult psychological
research involves deception (Adair, Dushenko, & Lindsay, 1985).
As many social psychologists have discovered, however, the study of
many social psychological phenomena often requires the use of mild deception to
elicit natural reactions from participants.  Thus, those developmental researchers
who are interested in social psychological constructs often face a paradox –
deception may be necessary to understand children’s natural responses to certain
situations, but researchers are urged to avoid deception in research involving
children.  The only way this ethical dilemma may be resolved is by the
development of an effective and developmentally appropriate debriefing about
deception, such that the concerns of many developmentalists are addressed.
Unfortunately, little research has assessed which types of debriefing are effective
for children at different developmental periods.
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The Society for Research in Child Development (SRCD) offers little
guidance for the appropriate protocol for debriefing children after deception.
SRCD guidelines state, “If withholding information or deception is practiced, and
there is reason to believe that the research participants will be negatively affected
by it, adequate measures should be taken after the study to ensure the participant's
understanding of the reasons for the deception”!(SRCD, 1991).  What these
adequate measures may be, however, is not mentioned.
Some research with adults has addressed how different debriefing
protocols may affect participants’ self-perceptions following negative feedback.
Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975) found that participants showed a
“perseverance phenomenon,” in that their self-perceptions continued to be
adversely affected by negative feedback, even after hearing a standard debriefing
in which they were told the feedback was false.  They found, however, that when
participants were told of this phenomenon and explicitly told about participants’
tendencies to be biased by the feedback (despite its inaccuracy), their self-
perceptions were not adversely affected.  Marketing researchers (Toy, Olsen, &
Wright, 1989) also found that participants who heard a comparable, thorough
debriefing were more likely to feel that the deception was justified than
participants who heard a minimal debriefing.
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Although an explicit debriefing seems to negate any adverse effects of
deception with adults (Ross, et al., 1975; Toy, et al., 1989), this style of debriefing
may be too complex for children.  For example, studies suggest that children
younger than 10 may not understand the purpose of the research they participated
in, even after an explicit debriefing (Hurley & Underwood, 2002; Nannis, 1991).
Likewise, young children may not understand the rationale for the deception.
Being told about deception may make children mistrustful of researchers and
science.  In addition, children may not understand that the negative feedback was
false, even when told so, and may actually believe it to be true.
A cognitively simpler method of ensuring that children are not adversely
affected by negative feedback would be to simply state that the feedback itself
was an error and to replace the negative feedback with positive feedback.  Thus,
children would not be aware of the deception, yet would leave the research
experience feeling positively (although the positive feeling would be unfounded).
In fact, half of the studies involving deception with children used this method of
debriefing.  Only one-third of the studies gave children an explicit debriefing as to
the true nature of the study.
The lack of consensus on how to best debrief children after studies
involving deception highlights the scarcity of empirical research on this ethical-
methodological issue.  Thus, although SRCD states that, “[the] deception methods
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[should] have no known negative effects on the child or the child's family”
(SRCD, 1991), developmentalists are unclear as to how to ensure this is the case.
Therefore, the present study will assess how these two styles of debriefing
(explicit/ educational disclosure versus positive feedback, but no disclosure)
affect children’s attitudes not only about themselves and their own abilities, but
also about science and research in general.  !               
SUMMARY AND HYPOTHESES
In summary, most research suggests that many children, by 5 to 6 years of
age, are aware that discrimination may exist as a social phenomenon.  By 9 years
of age, children are able to attend to situational cues when making attributions to
discrimination (that is targeted to someone else), and thus their attributions to
discrimination parallel those made by adults.  However, it is still unclear when
and how children personally experience and understand discrimination.
Therefore, the present study will examine at what age children perceive
discrimination when they are the targets of the bias, as well as whether children at
different ages respond differentially to situational information about the
likelihood of discrimination.
Based on previous research with children and adults, it is predicted that
children as young as 5 years old may make some attributions to discrimination.  It
is predicted, however, that older children will be more likely than younger
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children to attend to situational information about the likelihood of discrimination
when making attributions to discrimination.  Specifically, it is predicted that older
children will only make attributions to discrimination when the information
suggests that it is a viable option, whereas younger children will not show
differential attributions based on situational information.
Children’s experiences in social groups may also affect their attributions
to discrimination.  Research suggests that girls, perhaps because of their
experience in stigmatized groups, have a broader awareness of the lower social
status of females relative to males (Brown & Bigler, 2003; Killen & Stangor,
2001; Theimer, et al., 2001).  Therefore, it is predicted that girls will make more
attributions to discrimination than boys.
It is likely that children’s understanding of others’ cognitions will affect
their perceptions of discrimination.  For example, a child must understand that
others’ cognitions are interpretive in nature before he or she can understand why
some people may discriminate and others do not.  Children develop this ability
around age 7 (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996).  Therefore, the present study will
examine whether children’s interpretive theory of mind abilities predict children’s
attributions to discrimination.  It is predicted that children with a more advanced
theory of mind will be more likely to make an attribution to discrimination than
children with a less advanced theory of mind.
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 In addition to developmental and situational variables, it is predicted that
children’s own gender attitudes will affect at what age and under which
circumstances children will make attributions to discrimination.  Children who
endorse the belief that gender is a reasonable criterion for differential treatment
may be unlikely to label differential treatment as discrimination.  Specifically,
based on Brown and Bigler (2003), it is predicted that children who hold non-
biased, egalitarian attitudes toward gender groups will make more attributions to
discrimination, and make them at a younger age, than children with more biased
attitudes.  Therefore, it is predicted that gender attitudes will predict attributions
to discriminations and moderate the relationship between children’s cognitive
development and their attributions to discrimination.
The study will assess whether state self-esteem, perceived control,
motivation, identification with the domain, and perceived importance of the
domain are affected by perceptions of discrimination.  It is predicted that
perceptions of discrimination will have both positive and negative effects on
children.  Specifically, based on research with adults (e.g., Cohen, et al., 1999;
Crocker, et al. 1993), it is predicted that children who make attributions to
discrimination will show lower social state self-esteem, higher performance state
self-esteem, and lower perceived control (on both performance and social
domains) than children who do not make attributions to discrimination.  It is also
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predicted that children who make attributions to discrimination will be less
motivated to continue working on the task, will be less identified with the domain,
and will consider the domain less important than children who do not make
attributions to discrimination.
Finally, the present study will analyze how different debriefing protocols
affect children’s attitudes about themselves and research.  It is predicted that older
children will respond more positively than younger children to the explicit
debriefing about the true purpose of the research.  In contrast, it is predicted that
both groups will respond positively to having their negative feedback replaced
with positive feedback.  It is predicted, however, that children in the explicit
debriefing condition will report having learned more, as a result of their
participation, than children in the positive feedback condition.
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CHAPTER TWO:
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Participants consisted of 55 children (29 girls, 26 boys), ranging in age
from 5 years, 3 months to 11 years, 3 months.  The mean age was 8 years, 3
months (SD = 1 year, 7 months).  The participants were from the after-school
programs of three elementary schools, and were from a range of socioeconomic
classes and ethnic backgrounds (21 were Euro-American, 19 were Hispanic, and
15 were African-American).  Only those children with parental consent, and who
themselves gave assent, participated in the study (see Appendix A for parental
consent letter).
OVERVIEW OF PROCEDURE
All measures were given to the children individually by a same-gender
experimenter.  First, children’s theory of mind reasoning and gender attitudes
were assessed.  One week later, a different experimenter gave children mild
negative feedback and then administered measures designed to assess children’s
attributions to discrimination, self-esteem, motivation, and perceived control.  All
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children were then debriefed following one of two debriefing protocols.  One
week later, children were asked follow-up questions about the study and the
debriefing process.
PRE-TESTING MEASURES: INDIVIDUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DIFFERENCES
Theory of mind
To determine whether children’s theory of mind development is a
significant predictor of their perceptions of discrimination, children were
administered an interpretive theory of mind task developed by Carpendale and
Chandler (1996).  The task is designed to assess whether children understand that
ambiguous situations can be reasonably interpreted in different ways by different
people, and that it is difficult (if not impossible) to predict how individuals might
interpret such a situation.
Specifically, children were presented with three situations in which two
puppets were asked to interpret an ambiguous word, referent, or figure (see
Appendix C).  For example, children were told that two puppets (Bob and
Wendy) were playing a game in which they had to “wait for a ring.”  Children
were then asked if it was reasonable that Bob thinks he is waiting for the phone to
ring, while Wendy thinks she is waiting for a diamond ring.  Children were given
one point if they judged both interpretations legitimate because of the ambiguous
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nature of the stimuli.  Children were also asked whether they could predict what a
third puppet would think.  Children were given an additional point if they
declined to make a prediction and correctly explained why it would be difficult to
know.  Thus, the total score could range from 0 to 6 (i.e., two points for each
situation), with higher score indicating better understanding.
Gender attitudes
To determine whether children’s attitudes about gender moderate their
perceptions of discrimination, children’s gender attitudes were assessed using the
activity subscale of a sex-typing measure (Children’s Occupation, Activity, and
Trait – Attitude Measure [COAT-AM]), developed by Liben and Bigler (2002).
Specifically, children were asked “who should” perform each of 25 activities (10
stereotypically female, 10 stereotypically male, and 5 neutral).  Children
responded using the options “only boys,” “only girls,” or “both boys and girls.”
The number of times children gave egalitarian responses (i.e., “both boys and
girls”) to stereotypical activities was computed.  Thus, scores ranged from 0 to 20
with higher scores indicating more egalitarian beliefs.
PROCEDURE
One week after the pretest measures were given, a different same-gender
experimenter returned to the school.  Prior to the experimental procedure, all
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children were randomly assigned to one of two conditions of varying situational
information.  Children were presented with situational information that suggested
that discrimination was either likely or unlikely.
Specifically, children were taken individually to a testing room by the
experimenter.  Child were told that they would be drawing a self-portrait to be
entered into a state-wide drawing contest.  This task was chosen because it makes
the child’s gender apparent to others.  Children were told that many other children
would be drawing self-portraits for the contest and a judge (or judges) would
decide which ones are good enough to win.  The judge was described as a teacher
from another school district.  To reinforce to the children that the judge would be
aware of their gender, all children were told that a picture would be taken of them
(ostensibly so that the judge could determine the quality of the drawings).  The
experimenter then took a Polaroid photograph of the child.  All of the children
were given their photograph, a large piece of drawing paper, and crayons, and told
that they had five minutes to complete their drawing.  Once the children’s
drawings were completed, children were allowed to return to their normal
activities while the judge ostensibly evaluated their drawings.
After several minutes, the experimenter met with the child again, returning
with the child’s drawing and his or her Polaroid photograph.  Before the
experimenter gave the child feedback on his or her drawing, children were shown
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a scrapbook of the “judges” and “past winners.”  Children in the likely
discrimination condition were shown a Polaroid photograph of an adult judge of
the other gender (e.g., girls were shown a photograph of a male judge), whereas
children in the unlikely discrimination condition were shown photographs of adult
judges of both genders.  Children were then shown Polaroid photographs of two
“past winners.”  Children in the likely discrimination condition were shown
photographs of two children of the other gender, whereas children in the unlikely
discrimination condition were shown photographs of both a boy and a girl.
Children were then told that the judge had compared their drawing to the
drawing of another child (or children).  Specifically, children in the likely
discrimination condition were shown a photograph of a same-race, other-gender
child, whereas children in the unlikely discrimination condition were shown
photographs of both a boy and a girl (at least one of the photographs was of a
same-race child).2  Children were told that both their picture and the picture of
the other child (or children) were judged to be of the same good quality, but
because of a limit to the number of children allowed to go to the statewide
contest, the child’s picture was not selected as the winner.  The children did not
see the other child’s drawing.
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POST-TESTING MEASURES
Attributions to discrimination
Following the feedback, children were asked a series of questions.  First,
in an open-ended format, children were asked why they were not selected as the
winner.  Their answers were recorded and their attributions were coded.
Children were then read a list of five possible experimenter-provided reasons for
why they were not selected.  The possible reasons were: (a) her (his) drawing
wasn’t as good, (b) the assignment wasn’t fair, (c) she (he) didn’t try as hard, (d)
she (he) wasn’t as good a drawer, (e) the judge(s) likes to pick boys (girls).
Children rated how true each reason was on a scale of 0 (not at all true) to 4 (very
true).  The scale was accompanied by a graphic representation of responses (i.e.,
cups with increasing levels of liquid).  Children’s mean ratings of the veracity of
each attribution type were computed.
Self-esteem
To determine whether self-esteem is affected by either experiencing
possible discrimination and/or making an attribution to discrimination, children’s
social and performance state self-esteem were assessed using a modified version
of the State Self-esteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991).  The scale has been
shown to have sound psychometric qualities (coefficient a = .92).  Although the
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scale has been shown to be appropriate with children as young as age 11 (Linton
& Marriott, 1996), the wording was altered slightly to make it more appropriate
for younger children.  Children were read 14 statements about how they may feel
right now regarding their social and performance self-esteem (see Appendix D).
Children rated each statement on a 5-point scale, ranging from 0 (not at all true) to
4 (very true).  Social and performance self-esteem each could range from 0 to 28,
with higher scores indicating higher self-esteem.
Motivation, importance, identification
 To determine whether motivation toward, identification with, and
importance of a domain are affected by either experiencing possible
discrimination and/or making an attribution to discrimination, children were asked
three questions (see Appendix E).  First, to assess motivation, children were
asked, “If you had the chance, how much would you want to draw your picture
over again for another chance in the contest?”  Children rated how their
motivation on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much).  Second, to
assess identification with the domain, children were asked, “How much is being a
good drawer an important part of who you are?”  They responded on a scale
ranging from 0 (not at all important) to 4 (very important).  Finally, to assess the
importance of the domain to the child, children were asked, “How important is it
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to be a good drawer?”  They responded on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all
important) to 4 (very important).
Perceived control
To determine whether domain-specific perceived control is affected by
either experiencing possible discrimination and/or making an attribution to
discrimination attributions to discrimination, children were asked a series of
questions about their social and performance perceived control (see Appendix E).
Children rated each possibility on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all true) to 4
(very true).  Children’s mean social and performance perceived control were
computed.
DEBRIEFING
Debriefing protocols
After completion of the measures, all the participants were debriefed.  A
complete debriefing protocol is presented in Appendix F.  First, children were
probed for suspicion about the manipulation.  Then, children heard either one of
two possible debriefing procedures, in which either (a) the negative feedback was
replaced with positive feedback, or (b) the true nature of the study was explicitly
explained.  In the positive feedback condition, children were told that there was
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an error in the judging.  They were told that there had been a mistake and that
they actually were chosen for the contest.  The experimenter apologized for the
error and complemented the child on his or her drawing.  Children were then
given a blue ribbon for their drawing.  Children were not informed of the true
nature of the experiment.
In the explicit debriefing condition, children were told that the contest and
judging were false.  The actual purpose of the study was explained.  The
experimenter and the child then discussed the topic of discrimination.  The
children were asked how they felt about the negative feedback, and told about
how most other children felt.  They were also told that some people still feel they
are not good at drawing, even after being told that that the judging was fictitious
(i.e., “perseverance phenomenon”).  Children were reminded that the judging was
made up, and reassured that the study had nothing to do with their actual drawing
ability.  The purpose of this debriefing was not only to help the child feel better
about the situation, but to better understand discrimination in general.  Children
were given a small gift as a token of appreciation.  Finally, all children (regardless
of condition) were asked to not mention the study to anyone else.
Debriefing follow-up measure
To assess the effects of each debriefing style, an experimenter returned to
the school one week later to ask each child a series of questions (see Appendix F).
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Questions pertained to children’s attitudes and feelings about their participation in
the study, about positive and negative aspects of research in general, about their
ability to draw, and about their gender group membership.  Children responded on
a 5-point scale, ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much).
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CHAPTER THREE:
RESULTS
OVERVIEW OF STATISTICAL ANALYSES
One primary purpose of this dissertation was to examine children’s
perceptions of discrimination that was directed at themselves.  This question was
addressed by analyzing children’s attributions to why they were not picked.
Specifically, children’s open-ended attributions to why they were not picked were
analyzed with log-linear models.  Children’s ratings of the veracity of the
experimenter-provided attribution types (i.e., discrimination, ability, quality,
effort, unfairness) were then analyzed with repeated measures analyses of
variance.  Analyses assessed whether child characteristics (i.e., age and gender)
predicted attributions, as well as whether child characteristics interacted with
situational information in predicting attributions (e.g., do children at different
ages respond differentially to situational information about the likelihood of
discrimination?).
The effects of individual and developmental differences on attributions to
discrimination were also assessed.  Specifically, regression analyses were
conducted to examine whether children’s theory of mind development predicted
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their attributions separately from age.  Logistic regressions were used for the
open-ended attributions and hierarchical multiple regression analyses were used
for the ratings of the veracity of the attributions.  To examine whether children’s
gender attitudes either predicted or moderated their attributions to discrimination,
hierarchical regression analyses were conducted.  Again, logistic regressions were
used for the open-ended attributions and hierarchical multiple regression analyses
were used for the ratings of the veracity of the attributions.
A second primary purpose of this dissertation was to examine the
consequences of experiencing and perceiving discrimination.  The effects of
experiencing discrimination on self-esteem, perceived control, motivation,
identification, and importance were analyzed via multivariate analyses of
variance.  In addition, the correlations between ratings of the veracity of
discrimination and the outcome variables were analyzed.  Analyses were also
conducted to examine whether children’s gender attitudes moderated the effects
of perceiving discrimination.
A third purpose of this dissertation was to examine the effects of the
debriefing protocols.  Specifically, multivariate analyses of variance were
conducted to examine how children’s attitudes were affected by the different
debriefing methodologies.
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ATTRIBUTIONS TO DISCRIMINATION
Open-ended attributions
Open-ended attributions were coded as being related to either (a)
discrimination (e.g., “Sometimes boys like to pick boys.”), (b) ability (e.g., “He
must be really good at drawing.”), (c) quality (e.g., “I didn’t draw a background in
my picture.”), (d) effort (e.g., “I didn’t try very hard.”), (e) idiosyncratic reasons
(e.g., “Maybe they forgot to give my drawing to him.”, “They never heard of
Anthony.”), or (f) “I don’t know”.  The percentage of children who gave each
type of attribution is presented in Table 3.  All responses were coded by the first
author and a proportion of the responses (40%) were then independently coded by
a research assistant.  Rate of agreement for the classification was 98%.   
Table 3.  Percentage of Open-ended Attributions by Situational Information
Condition
Attribution
Condition (n) Discrimination Ability Quality Effort Don’tknow Idiosyncratic
Likely (30) 13% 7% 33% 3% 33% 11%
Unlikely (25) 0% 28% 32% 8% 20% 12%
Overall
total (55) 7% 16% 32% 5% 27% 12%
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To assess how age, gender, and situational information affected children’s
open-ended attributions, log-linear models were analyzed.  Log-linear models
allow for the examination of categorical data by analyzing expected cell
frequencies in a contingency table (Knoke & Burke, 1980).  As is most common,
expected cell frequencies were obtained by using the Newton-Raphson algorithm.
Following Stevens (1996) and Knoke and Burke (1980), each hierarchical model
was tested using backward elimination, by first examining the most complex
model (involving a three-way interaction), followed by the next most
parsimonious model (involving three two-way interactions), until the most
parsimonious model that adequately fits the data is selected.  If deleting an effect
(e.g., the three-way interaction between situational information, gender, and
attribution type) does not cause a significant difference in the likelihood ratio chi-
square (L2), then the effect can be safely deleted from the model.  The final model
is considered to fit the data well if there is a small L2 relative to the df (i.e., the
observed cell frequencies do not differ much from the expected cell frequencies),
and thus we can accept the hypothesized model.  Probability levels greater than .1
are considered to represent adequately fitted models.
Two separate models were analyzed to examine the effects of age, gender,
and situational information on open-ended attributions.  Because of the resulting
small cell sizes due to the five different types of attributions examined, it was not
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possible to use one large model to examine the three variables simultaneously.
Therefore, one model included situational information (likely or unlikely), gender
(boy or girl), and type of attribution (discrimination, ability, quality, effort, or
don’t know).  A second model included situational information (likely or
unlikely), age group (younger or older, based on a median split), and type of
attribution (discrimination, ability, quality, effort, or don’t know).
For the model including situational information, gender, and type of
attribution, analyses indicated that the most parsimonious model that fit the data
involved the two-way interaction between situational information and attribution
type (L2 = 13.85, df = 10, p = .18).  Deleting this effect would have led to change
in L2 of 10.24 (p = .04).  For the model including situational information, age
group, and type of attribution, analyses indicated that the most parsimonious
model that fit the data again involved the two-way interaction between situational
information and attribution type (L2 = 10.31, df = 10, p = .41).  As before, deleting
this effect would have led to change in L2 of 10.24 (p = .04).  Thus, for both
models, only situational information (i.e., whether discrimination was likely or
unlikely) significantly affected the type of attribution children gave in response to
why they were not picked as the winner.
Analysis of simple effects revealed that situational information was
specifically related to attributions of both discrimination and ability.  Of those
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children who made an attribution to discrimination, 100% heard situational
information suggesting that discrimination was likely (L2 = 5.11, df = 1, p < .05).
Of those children who made an attribution to differences in ability, 22% heard
situational information suggesting that discrimination was likely and 77% heard
situational information suggesting that discrimination was unlikely (L2 = 4.68, df
= 1, p < .05).
Experimenter-provided attributions
Next, to analyze children’s mean ratings of the veracity of the
experimenter-provided attribution types, a 2 (situational information: likely or
unlikely) X 2 (gender of participant: boy or girl) X 2 (age group: younger or
older) X 5 (attribution type: discrimination, ability, quality, effort, unfairness)
repeated measures analysis of variance was conducted, in which the last variable
was treated as a within-subject variable.  Means are presented in Table 4.  The
main effect for attribution type was significant, F (4, 184) = 4.58, p < .05.  Post
hoc analyses (Tukey HSD tests used here and throughout paper for theoretically-
appropriate comparisons) indicated that, overall, children rated differences in
ability and quality as more accurate explanations for their feedback than
discrimination.  Children’s ratings of the other attribution types did not
significantly differ from one another.
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Table 4.  Mean Ratings of the Veracity of Each Experimenter-Provided
Attribution by Situational Information Condition, Gender, and Age Group
Attribution
Condition Age group(n) Discrimination Ability Quality Effort Unfairness
Likely
          Girls
5-8 (8) 1.50 (1.7) 2.13 (1.9) .50 (.54) 1.63 (1.8) 1.38 (1.7)
9-11 (8) 1.13 (.99) 1.13 (.64) 1.62 (1.1) .75 (.89) .25 (.71)
          Boys
5-8 (8) 2.13 (1.7) 2.13 (1.8) 2.00 (1.8) 2.63 (1.5) 2.50 (1.9)
9-11 (6) .33 (.52) 1.83 (.75) 2.00 (.89) 1.17 (1.6) .00 (.00)
          Total 1.33 (1.45) 1.80 (1.4) 1.50 (1.3) 1.57 (1.6) 1.10 (1.6)
Unlikely
          Girls
5-8 (5) 1.00 (1.7) 1.60 (2.2) .80 (1.1) 1.80 (1.8) 1.20 (1.6)
9-11 (7) .57 (1.5) .57 (.79) 1.86 (1.3) 1.14 (1.7) .71 (.95)
          Boys
5-8 (5) .40 (.55) 3.20 (.84) 3.40 (.89) 1.40 (1.9) 1.40 (1.9)
9-11 (7) .43 (.79) 1.57 (1.7) 2.00 (1.7) 1.43 (1.5) 1.57 (1.9)
          Total .58 (1.2) 1.63 (1.7) 2.00 (1.5) 1.42 (1.6) 1.21 (1.6)
Overall
Mean 1.00 (1.4) 1.72 (1.5) 1.72 (1.4) 1.50 (1.6) 1.15 (1.6)
Note: Numbers represent Means (Standard Deviations), and range from 0
to 4, with higher numbers indicating greater accuracy of attributions.
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The interaction between attribution type and gender was marginally
significant, F (4, 184) = 2.19, p = .07.  Post hoc analyses indicated that boys rated
differences in quality as a more accurate explanation for their feedback (M = 2.27;
SD = 1.5) than did girls (M = 1.21; SD = 1.1).  Boys also rated differences in
ability as a more accurate explanation for their feedback (M = 2.12; SD = 1.5)
than did girls (M = 1.36; SD = 1.5).
The three-way interaction between attribution type, situational
information, and age was also marginally significant, F (4, 184) = 2.23, p = .06.
Post hoc analyses indicated that younger children rated discrimination as a more
accurate explanation for their feedback when they were told that discrimination
was likely (M = 1.81; SD = 1.7) than when they were told that discrimination was
unlikely (M = .70; SD = 1.3).  Contrary to expectations, older children’s ratings of
discrimination did not differ based on situational information (overall M = .64; SD
= 1.0).
Post hoc analyses also indicated that, when children were told that
discrimination was unlikely, both younger and older children rated differences in
quality as a more accurate explanation for their feedback (Ms [SDs] = 2.10 [1.4],
1.93 [1.5], respectively) than discrimination (Ms [SDs] = .70 [1.3], .50 [1.2],
respectively).
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Significant effects that did not involve attribution type (i.e., collapsed
across reasons) were uninformative, and thus, are not described.
INDIVIDUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DIFFERENCES
Theory of mind
The mean interpretive theory of mind score was 2.93 (SD = 1.99).  Theory
of mind was positively correlated with age, r = .71 (p < .001).
To assess whether children’s theory of mind development predicted
whether children made an open-ended attribution to discrimination, independent
of age, interpretive theory of mind scores were entered into a logistic regression
model (following age in months).  The dependent variable was whether or not
children made an open-ended attribution to discrimination.  Results indicated that,
when entered after age, theory of mind development did not predict children’s
attributions to discrimination.  However, when entered separately, theory of mind
development did predict children’s attributions to discrimination (eb  = .46; Wald
= 3.56, p < .05), whereas age did not significantly predict such attributions.
Contrary to the hypothesis, children with more advanced understanding of theory
of mind were less likely to make an open-ended attribution to discrimination than
children with less advanced understanding of theory of mind.  Analyses of
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whether children’s age and theory of mind development predicted children’s other
types of open-ended attributions are presented in Appendix G.
To assess whether children’s theory of mind development predicted
children’s ratings of the veracity of discrimination when provided by the
experimenter, independent of age, interpretive theory of mind scores were entered
into a hierarchical multiple regression model (following age in months).
Children’s mean response to the veracity of discrimination was the dependent
variable.  To control the variability of ratings associated with different situational
information, the situational information condition (dummy coded as either likely
or unlikely) was entered into the regression model in the first step.  Once the
variance associated with situational information was accounted for (b  = -.27; t =
2.05, p < .05), children’s theory of mind development, but not age, accounted for
a significant amount of variance (b  = -.49; t = -2.78, p < .05).  As with children’s
open-ended attributions, children with more advanced understanding of theory of
mind rated discrimination as a less accurate explanation than did children with
less advanced understanding of theory of mind.  Analyses of whether children’s
age and theory of mind development predicted children’s ratings of the veracity of
the other experimenter-provided attributions are presented in Appendix G.
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Gender attitudes
The mean egalitarian gender attitude score was 10.31 (SD = 5.1).  As in
other research (Signorella, Bigler, & Liben, 1993), egalitarian gender attitudes
were moderately positively correlated with age, r = .25 (p = .06).  Gender
attitudes were not correlated with theory of mind scores.
It was hypothesized that children who hold non-biased, egalitarian
attitudes toward gender groups would make more attributions to discrimination,
and make them at a younger age, than children with more biased attitudes.  To test
these hypotheses, analyses were conducted to first examine whether children’s
gender attitudes predicted children’s open-ended attributions to discrimination
and their ratings of the veracity of discrimination.  Specifically, a logistic
regression model was analyzed with children’s gender attitude score as the
predictor and whether or not children made an open-ended attribution to
discrimination as the dependent variable.  A similar hierarchical multiple
regression model was also analyzed with children’s mean rating of the veracity of
discrimination as the dependent variable (to control the variability of ratings
associated with different situational information, the situational information
condition was again entered into the regression model in the first step).  Analyses
indicated that gender attitudes did not significantly predict children’s open-ended
attributions to discrimination or their ratings of the veracity of discrimination.
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Next, analyses were conducted to examine whether children’s gender
attitudes moderated the relationship between children’s theory of mind
development and their attributions to and ratings of discrimination.  To test for
moderation, a hierarchical logistic regression model was first analyzed, using
whether or not children made an open-ended attribution to discrimination as the
dependent variable.  In the first step, theory of mind was entered into the model.
In the second step, children’s mean egalitarian gender attitude score was entered
into the model.  In the third step, the interaction of theory of mind and gender
attitudes was entered into the model.  A statistically significant increase in R2 at
the third step would indicate the presence of a moderator.  Separate analyses were
conducted for children who were given situational information suggesting that
discrimination was likely and children given situational information suggesting
that discrimination was unlikely (because entering this variable as a predictor
would have substantially reduced power).  Similar analyses were conducted, using
hierarchical multiple regressions, to analyze children’s mean rating of the veracity
of discrimination.  Analyses indicated that gender attitudes did not significantly
moderate the relationship between children’s theory of mind development and
their open-ended attributions to discrimination or their ratings of the veracity of
discrimination.
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CONSEQUENCES OF DISCRIMINATION
Effects of experiencing discrimination
Analyses were conducted to examine the effects of negative feedback that
appeared to be discrimination (regardless of whether it was labeled as such) on
children’s social and performance state self-esteem, social and performance
perceived control, motivation, identification with domain, and perceived
importance of the domain.  Because there were several significant
intercorrelations among social and performance self-esteem, motivation, and
social and performance perceived control, they were analyzed in one multivariate
analysis of variance.  Intercorrelations are presented in Table 5.  Because
identification with domain and perceived importance of domain were correlated
with one another, they were analyzed in a separate multivariate analysis of
variance.  To assess the effects of negative feedback, a 2 (situational information:
likely or unlikely) X 2 (gender of participant: boy or girl) X 2 (age group:
younger or older) MANOVA was conducted for the two sets of outcome
variables.  Means are presented in Table 6.  The results are organized and
presented by outcome variable.
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Social self-esteem
Results of the 2 (situational information: likely or unlikely) X 2 (gender of
participant: boy or girl) X 2 (age group: younger or older) MANOVA indicated
that only the main effect of age was significant for social self-esteem, F (1, 46) =
7.34, p < .05.  Younger children exhibited lower social self-esteem (M = 17.96;
SD = 5.4) than older children (M = 22.00; SD = 5.4).
Table 5. Outcome Variable Correlations
Correlations
Outcome
variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Performance
self-esteem 1
2. Social
self-esteem .42** 1
3. Performance
perceived
control -.02 -.31
* 1
4. Social
perceived
control
.24 -.12 .41* 1
5. Motivation .33* .08 .20 .17 1
6. Identification -.06 -.03 .16 -.13 -.13 1
7. Importance -.22 -.15 .19 -.24 -.24 .52** 1
** p < .005, * p < .05
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Table 6.  Outcome Variable Means by Situational Information Condition, Gender,
and Age Group
Attribution
Condition Agegroup
Social self-
esteem
Performance
self-esteem
Social
perceived
control
Performance
perceived
control
Motivation
Likely
Girls
5-8 18.63 (6.2) 19.13 (6.1) 2.81 (1.3) 3.08 (1.0) 2.00 (1.9)
9-11 23.25 (5.8) 21.50 (3.7) 2.19 (.53) 3.04 (.62) 3.63 (.52)
Boys
5-8 18.13 (5.9) 19.63 (7.5) 3.00 (.89) 3.04 (.72) 3.75 (.46)
9-11 22.83 (2.5) 21.83 (3.2) 2.25 (.52) 2.61 (.83) 2.83 (1.2)
Total 23.07 (4.5) 20.43 (5.4) 2.58 (.95) 2.97 (.78) 3.07 (1.3)
Unlikely
Girls
5-8 16.00 (5.8) 18.80 (7.2) 3.10 (1.0) 3.27 (.76) 4.00 (.00)
9-11 23.00 (6.7) 22.14 (4.2) 2.29 (.99) 2.00 (.84) 3.43 (1.1)
Boys
5-8 18.60 (3.7) 22.80 (4.8) 2.80 (1.5) 2.53 (1.1) 3.20 (1.1)
9-11 18.86 (5.3) 19.00 (4.2) 2.36 (1.1) 2.76 (.71) 2.86 (.90)
Total 20.93 (6.2) 20.67 (5.0) 2.58 (1.1) 2.59 (.91) 3.33 (.96)
Overall
Mean 22.00 (5.4) 20.54 (5.2) 2.58 (1.0) 2.80 (85) 3.19 (1.2)
Note: Numbers represent Means (Standard Deviations).  Self-esteem scores have
a possible range from 0 to 28, whereas perceived control and motivation have a
possible range of 0 to 4.  Higher numbers indicate a greater degree of the
construct.
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Performance self-esteem
Results of the 2 (situational information: likely or unlikely) X 2 (gender of
participant: boy or girl) X 2 (age group: younger or older) MANOVA indicated
performance self-esteem was not affected by situational information, gender, or
age.
Motivation
Results of the 2 (situational information: likely or unlikely) X 2 (gender of
participant: boy or girl) X 2 (age group: younger or older) MANOVA indicated
that the interaction between gender and age was significant for motivation, F (1,
46) = 3.74, p < .05.  Post hoc analyses indicated that younger boys (M = 3.54; SD
= .78), and older girls (M = 3.53; SD = .83), exhibited more motivation to try
again than their age or gender counterparts (Ms [SDs]: older boys, 2.85 [.99];
younger girls, 2.77 [1.8]).  In other words, motivation to try again decreased for
boys as they got older, but increased for girls as they got older.
The interaction between situational information and gender was also
significant for motivation, F (1, 46) = 3.74, p < .05.  However, this interaction
was subsumed by a significant three-way interaction between situational
information, gender, and age, F (1, 46) = 5.37, p < .05.  Post hoc analyses
indicated that younger girls, but not younger boys, exhibited less motivation to try
again if they experienced negative feedback that was likely discrimination than if
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they experienced negative feedback that was unlikely discrimination.  Older
children’s motivation was not affected by situational information.
Social perceived control
Results of the 2 (situational information: likely or unlikely) X 2 (gender of
participant: boy or girl) X 2 (age group: younger or older) MANOVA indicated
that only the main effect of age was significant for social perceived control, F (1,
46) = 5.34, p < .05.  Younger children exhibited greater social perceived control
(M = 2.92; SD = 1.1) than older children (M = 2.27; SD = .77).
Performance perceived control
Results of the 2 (situational information: likely or unlikely) X 2 (gender of
participant: boy or girl) X 2 (age group: younger or older) MANOVA indicated
that the three-way interaction between situational information, gender, and age
was significant for performance perceived control, F (1, 46) = 4.28, p < .05.
Contrary to expectations, post hoc analyses indicated that older girls, but not
younger girls, exhibited more performance perceived control if they experienced
negative feedback that was likely to be discrimination than if they experienced
negative feedback that was unlikely to be discrimination.  Boys’ performance
perceived control was not affected by situational information.
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Identification and importance
Results of the 2 (situational information: likely or unlikely) X 2 (gender of
participant: boy or girl) X 2 (age group: younger or older) MANOVA indicated
that identification with domain and perceived importance of the domain were not
affected by situational information, gender, or age.
Effects of perceiving discrimination
The results of the above analyses suggest that experiencing discrimination
can affect children’s motivation and perceived control.  It is possible, however,
that there are also effects associated with actually perceiving negative feedback as
discrimination.  Unfortunately, too few children made an open-ended attribution
to discrimination to compare outcome scores across groups (those who perceived
discrimination vs. those who did not).  To address this question, therefore,
correlations between the ratings of the veracity of the discrimination and the
outcome variables were examined for children who heard situational suggesting
the discrimination was likely.  Analyses of the correlations between children’s
ratings of the veracity of the other experimenter-provided attributions and the
outcome variables are presented in Appendix G.
Of the children who experienced negative feedback that was likely
discrimination, those children who rated discrimination as a more accurate
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explanation for their feedback showed increased ratings of the importance of
drawing, r = .39.
Gender attitudes as moderator of consequences
Analyses were also conducted to examine whether children’s gender
attitudes moderated the effects of perceiving discrimination.  That is, although
children with egalitarian gender attitudes did not perceive discrimination more
often than children with stereotypical attitudes, it is likely that children with
egalitarian gender attitudes are more affected by their perceptions of
discrimination than children with stereotypical attitudes.  To test this question, a
series of hierarchical multiple regression models were analyzed, using children’s
outcome variable means as the dependent variables.  In the first step, situational
information condition and ratings of the veracity of discrimination were entered
into the model.  In the second step, children’s mean egalitarian gender attitude
score was entered into the model.  In the third step, the interaction of ratings of
discrimination and gender attitudes was entered into the model. Analyses
indicated that gender attitudes moderated the effects of perceiving discrimination
for several outcome variables.
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Social self-esteem
First, gender attitudes moderated the relationship between perceiving
discrimination and social self-esteem (change in F (1, 49) = 5.44, p < .05;
interaction term: b  = -.65; t = -2.33, p < .05).  Examination of the slopes for the
discrimination rating and social self-esteem relation at low (r = -.01, ns) and high
(r = -.56, p < .05) levels of egalitarian gender attitudes suggested that, for children
with high egalitarian gender attitudes (based on a median split), rating
discrimination as a more accurate explanation for their feedback was associated
with lower social self-esteem.
Social perceived control
Gender attitudes marginally moderated the relationship between
perceiving discrimination and social perceived control (change in F (1, 49) =
3.41, p = .07; interaction term: b  = .52; t = 1.85, p = .07).  Examination of the
slopes for the discrimination rating and social perceived control relation at low (r
= .07, ns) and high (r = .48, p < .05) levels of egalitarian gender attitudes
suggested that, for children with high egalitarian gender attitudes, rating
discrimination as a more accurate explanation for their feedback was associated
with higher social perceived control.
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Performance perceived control
Gender attitudes also moderated the relationship between perceiving
discrimination and performance perceived control (change in F (1, 49) = 5.28, p <
.05; interaction term: b  = .65; t = 2.29, p < .05).  Examination of the slopes for
the discrimination rating and performance perceived control relation at low (r = -
.06, ns) and high (r = .64, p < .005) levels of egalitarian gender attitudes
suggested that, for children with high egalitarian gender attitudes, rating
discrimination as a more accurate explanation for their feedback was associated
with higher performance perceived control.
DEBRIEFING METHODOLOGIES
Analyses were conducted that examined the effects of the two debriefing
protocols on children’s attitudes about research and themselves.  Because there
was a unique hypothesis for each item on the debriefing measure, a series of
univariate ANOVAs were conducted on children’s ratings of (a) how much they
enjoyed the study, (b) their desire to participate in future studies, (c) how unfair
the study was, (d) how fun the study was, (e) how much they learned from the
study, (f) how much the study was helpful to others, (g) how confident they are in
their own drawing ability, and (h) how happy they are with their gender group
membership.  Because conducting several univariate tests increases the risk of
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Type I error, only those one-tailed tests that are significant at the .05 level are
discussed.  Intercorrelations and means for each question are presented in Table 7.
Table 7.  Debriefing Follow-up Correlations and Means by Debriefing Condition
Correlations Means (SD)
Debriefing
question 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Positive Explicit
1. Enjoyed
participation 1 3.88 (.33) 3.76 (.56)
2. Future
participation .42** 1 3.00 (1.3) 3.47 (.87)
3. Study was
unfair -.07 -.23 1 .82 (1.47) 1.00 (1.6)
4. Study was
fun .48** .48** -.31* 1 3.65 (.86) 3.59 (.79)
5.Study was
learning
experience .21 .17 -.09 .43
* 1 3.06 (1.1) 3.35 (.93)
6. Study was
helpful .05 .09 -.43 -.19 .14 1 2.71 (1.3) 3.62 (.72)
7. Confident
in abilities .46** .21 .38 .22 .51** .18 1 3.19 (.98) 2.82 (1.3)
8. Happy with
gender .42
** .19 -.04 .31* -.25 -.14 .11 1 3.90 (.30) 3.41(1.3)
** p < .005, * p < .05
Results from the ANOVAs indicated that the interaction between
debriefing condition and age was significant for how much children wanted to
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participate in another study in the future, F  (1, 29) = 4.51, p < .05.  Post hoc
analyses indicated, among younger children, those who heard the explicit
debriefing were more likely to want to participate in another study in the future
(M = 3.60; SD = .97) than those who heard the positive debriefing (M = 2.44; SD
= 1.6).  In contrast, among older children, those who heard the positive debriefing
were more likely to want to participate in another study in the future (M = 3.63;
SD = .52) than those who heard the explicit debriefing (M = 3.29; SD = .76).
Results also indicated that the interaction between debriefing condition
and age was significant for how much fun they considered the study to be, F  (1,
29) = 8.38, p < .05.  Post hoc analyses indicated, among younger children, those
who heard the explicit debriefing were more likely to consider the study fun (M =
3.90; SD = .32) than those who heard the positive debriefing (M = 3.33; SD =
1.1).  In contrast, among older children, those who heard the positive debriefing
were more likely to consider the study fun (M = 4.00; SD = .00) than those who
heard the explicit debriefing (M = 3.00; SD = 1.1).
Results also indicated that there was significant main effect of debriefing
condition for how much children considered the study to be helpful to others, F
(1, 29) = 5.40, p < .05.  Specifically, children who heard the explicit debriefing
were more likely to think that they study was helpful to others than children who
heard the positive debriefing.
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Analyses examining the joint effects of different debriefing protocols and
different situational information on children’s attitudes about research and
themselves are presented in Appendix G.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
DISCUSSION
The primary purpose of this dissertation was to examine children’s
perceptions of gender discrimination, with a particular focus on (a) the situational,
developmental, and individual factors that predict perceptions of discrimination,
and (b) the effects of such perceptions on state self-esteem, perceived control,
motivation, identification with the domain, and perceived importance of the
domain.
CHILDREN’S PERCEPTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION
This study suggests that, in general, children may rarely make attributions
to gender discrimination.  Although all children received negative feedback about
their performance in an art contest, only 7% of the participants (n = 4)
spontaneously reported that discrimination was the reason for their negative
feedback.  As predicted, all of the children who made an attribution to
discrimination heard situational information suggesting that discrimination was
likely to have occurred.  That is, only girls who saw a male judge who had chosen
boys in the past, and who chose a boy this time, made an attribution to
discrimination.  No children who heard situational information suggesting that
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discrimination was unlikely to have occurred made an attribution to
discrimination.  Overall, based on both open-ended attributions and ratings of
experimenter-provided attributions, children were more likely to attribute their
negative feedback to the poor quality of their artwork or their poor ability as an
artist than attribute the negative feedback to discrimination.
It was hypothesized that older children would attend more to situational
information than younger children when making attributions to discrimination.
Thus, older children (but not younger children) were expected to make a greater
number of attributions to discrimination when the situational information
suggested that discrimination was likely than when it was unlikely.  Results did
not support this hypothesis.  Based on both open-ended attributions and ratings of
experimenter-provided attributions, it was younger children (rather than older
children) in this condition who were more likely to perceive discrimination.
Specifically, of those children who spontaneously reported that discrimination
was the reason for their feedback, 75% were in the younger age group.
Not only were older children reluctant to make attributions to
discrimination (even when it was likely to have occurred), many older children
had difficulty articulating a reason for the negative feedback.  When asked why
they received negative feedback, 57% of the older children in the likely condition
(compared to 20% in the unlikely condition) replied, “I don’t know.”
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 Older children’s low rates of making an attribution to discrimination (and
their high rates of stating no attribution at all) are probably not due to a cognitive
limitation.  Because younger children are able to perceive discrimination, it is
unlikely that older children would have lost this ability.  A second, more likely
explanation involves a motivational reason.  Older children may have been
cognitively able to perceive discrimination, but may have been less willing to
verbally state that discrimination was the reason for their negative feedback.  This
unwillingness could be driven by two different, but not mutually exclusive,
motives.  First, there may be heavy psychological costs (such as a perceived lack
of control over outcomes and a diminished belief in a fair and just world)
associated with making an attribution to discrimination that may have prevented
older children from making such attributions.  Older children may be more aware
than younger children that perceiving discrimination is uncomfortable, and thus
should be minimized as much as possible.  Research with adults suggests that this
is why adults are more likely to perceive discrimination that is directed to their
group than discrimination directed to themselves (e.g., Crosby, 1984, Major &
Crocker, 1994; Major, et al., 2000).
The second motivational reason that may drive older children’s reluctance
to state attributions to discrimination is their greater awareness of the social costs
associated with making an attribution to discrimination.  For example, older
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children may have understood that the experimenter either worked with or knew
the discriminatory judge (based on information given in the cover story), and thus
may have been reluctant to tell the experimenter that their colleague was acting
unfairly.  Older children may have been more aware than younger children of the
social norms that typically discourage individuals from making public accusations
of discrimination.
A final reason older children may have made fewer attributions to
discrimination and said “I don’t know” more than younger children may be
because of older children’s general tendency to inhibit responses or withhold
judgments when there is insufficient evidence to warrant an accurate response
(Gnepp & Klayman, 1992).  Older children may have simply considered the
discriminatory situation to be too ambiguous to confidently make an attribution at
all, whereas younger children did not feel so constrained.
Future research should experimentally address these possibilities.  For
example, to assess whether children can detect discrimination, even if they are not
able to articulate it, children could be asked to select a photograph of a child that
they think might be chosen for the contest.  If a girl selects a boy as a probable
winner, it could be inferred that she understands the manifestations of
discrimination, even if she is not articulating it.  To examine whether children are
simply reluctant to tell an adult that another adult is acting unfairly, children could
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be given the opportunity to confer with a confederate child about why they were
not chosen for the contest.
In addition to situational factors, individual and developmental factors
affected which children made attributions to discrimination.  As hypothesized,
girls made more attributions to discrimination than did boys.  Although there was
insufficient power to produce a statistically significant effect, all the children who
gave a spontaneous attribution to discrimination were girls (n = 4).  It seems
possible that girls’ experiences lead them to develop a greater awareness of the
lower social status of females relative to males.  Girls’ awareness of the lower
status of the female role may, in turn, lead them to develop a higher sensitivity
for, and expectation of, discriminatory treatment than boys.
In terms of developmental factors, it was predicted that children’s
interpretive theory of mind development would be a cognitive prerequisite to
perceiving discrimination.  Contrary to expectations, children with less advanced
understanding of theory of mind were more likely to make an attribution to
discrimination than children with more advanced understanding of theory of mind
Theory of mind was actually a better predictor of attributions to discrimination
than age.  This finding supports the previous supposition that older children may
have perceived their feedback to be discrimination, but because of their greater
awareness of the costs associated with discrimination (due to their more advanced
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cognitive abilities), are reluctant to make an attribution to discrimination.  This
hypothesis is further supported by the finding that children with more advanced
understanding of theory of mind were more likely to say, “ I don’t know” than
children with less advanced understanding of theory of mind.
CONSEQUENCES OF DISCRIMINATION
This dissertation also examined the effects of discrimination on state self-
esteem, perceived control, motivation, identification with the domain, and
perceived importance of the domain.  To answer this research question, two types
of effects were examined: (a) the effects of receiving negative feedback that
appears to be discrimination (regardless of one’s perceptions), and (b) the effects
of attributing negative feedback to discrimination.
  The results indicate that there are, indeed, effects of simply experiencing
likely discrimination.  The effects, however, depend on the gender and age of the
child.  For example, when children received negative feedback that was likely to
be discrimination, younger girls were most likely to show decreased motivation to
try again, compared to older girls and both younger and older boys.  If this
decrease in motivation also occurs in academic settings (e.g., math class), this
finding suggests that young girls may show early signs of disengaging from
certain academic domains.  Older girls, however, were more likely than the other
children to show increased performance perceived control.  In other words, older
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girls (after receiving negative feedback that was likely to be discrimination) were
optimistic that, if they drew their picture again, they would be chosen the next
time.
There are additional effects for children who perceived their negative
feedback to be discrimination.  Specifically, children who perceived
discrimination to have occurred were more likely to say that drawing is an
important skill than children who did not perceive discrimination.  This finding
was contrary to predictions.  It seems possible, however, that children who
perceived discrimination were able to maintain that drawing is important because
their negative feedback was not due to their own inabilities as an artist, regardless
of that particular contest’s outcome.  It also seems possible that this effect would
change with repeated exposures to discrimination.  Future research should
examine whether children who repeatedly perceive discrimination in a particular
domain begin to decrease the value placed on that domain.
Interestingly, children who perceived just a general unfairness of the
contest were more likely to show decreased social self-esteem (as was predicted
for children who perceived discrimination) than children who did not perceive the
contest to be unfair.  In other words, children who perceived the contest to be
unfair were more concerned about what others thought of them than children who
did not perceive the contest to be unfair.  Children who perceived general
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unfairness also showed increased performance perceived control and were more
likely to say that drawing is an important skill (as with children who perceived
discrimination) than children who did not perceive unfairness.
Taken together, these findings suggest that some children may have
detected the unfairness of the contest, but did not attribute that unfairness to be
based on their gender.  These findings also suggest that perceiving unfairness
(whether it is generalized or discrimination based on gender) may lead children to
have lower motivation, lower social self-esteem, higher social and performance
perceived control, and higher ratings of the importance of the domain.
Future research should clarify the direction of the causal chain implied
here.  For example, it is possible that children with lower social self-esteem are
simply more likely to consider any type of negative feedback unfair.  Therefore,
future studies employing pretest and posttest measures of the outcome variables
assessed here should be conducted to determine whether perceptions of
discrimination affect an individual’s motivation, self-esteem, perceived control,
and perceived importance of domain.
Although gender attitudes did not predict attributions to discrimination, or
moderate the relationship between cognitive development and attributions, gender
attitudes did moderate the effects of perceiving discrimination.  For children with
strong egalitarian gender attitudes (i.e., children who think both boys and girls
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should do most activities), perceiving discrimination was related to decreased
social self-esteem and increased perceived control.  Children with more
stereotypical attitudes appear to be largely unaffected by perceptions of
discrimination.  Thus, children who endorse the belief that gender is not an
appropriate basis for differential treatment appear to be more affected by gender
discrimination than do their peers who agree with the use of gender as a means of
determining outcomes.
Upon examination of the results, an interesting pattern appears among
children.  Many children seem to have an inflated sense of optimism.  Many of
them noted that if they drew their picture again, or met with the judge, they would
have improved results.  This is particularly true for children who think the reason
for their negative feedback is discrimination or general unfairness of the contest.
It appears, therefore, that children do not think of these types of injustices as
systemic or widespread; they are only the result of a particular judge at a
particular time.  It is unclear, based on the current study, whether children thought
that acting discriminatory was a stable character trait of their particular judge (and
thus, he or she would be discriminatory every time he or she judged), or if they
thought that the act of discrimination was unique to this contest.  Future research
should examine whether children consider being discriminatory to be a stable, or
situational, behavior.
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In summary, this study suggests that children are able to perceive
discrimination as young as 5 years old.  In addition, children do attend to
situational information about the likelihood of discrimination.  However, as
children become older, they appear to be less willing to make attributions to
discrimination (regardless of the situational information) – perhaps because of the
psychological or social costs associated with making attributions to
discrimination.  Especially for children with strong egalitarian gender attitudes,
perceptions of discrimination, or at least unfairness, appear to lead to lower
motivation to try again, lower social self-esteem (i.e., more concern with others’
opinions of you), greater performance perceived control (i.e., more confident that
you can improve on your performance), and greater value placed on the domain.
DEBRIEFING METHODOLOGIES
The secondary purpose of this dissertation was to examine how different
debriefing protocols following deception affected children’s attitudes about
research and themselves.  Results indicated that there are uniquely beneficial
aspects to both types of debriefing.  For example, as predicted, children who
heard the positive debriefing considered themselves to be better at drawing than
children who heard the explicit debriefing.  This is not surprising given that
children who heard the positive debriefing were told that they had just won an art
contest.  In contrast, and as predicted, children who heard the explicit debriefing
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thought that the study was more helpful to others than children who heard the
positive debriefing.  This indicates that children did attend to the information
conveyed in the explicit debriefing protocol and, at a minimum, remembered the
goal of the study was to help others.
It was predicted that older children, because of their more advanced
cognitive development, would respond more positively to the explicit debriefing
regarding the true nature of the research than younger children.  This finding was
not supported, however.  In fact, older children exhibited more negative reactions
to the explicit debriefing than younger children.  For example, older children were
less likely to want to participate in another study and considered this study to be
less fun if they heard the explicit debriefing than if they heard the positive
debriefing.  This may be partially explained by the finding that, albeit not
statistically significant, older children were more likely to say that the study was
unfair if they heard the explicit debriefing than if they heard the positive
debriefing.  It is possible, therefore, that older children who heard the explicit
debriefing considered the study to be more unfair, which led them to find the
study less fun, and they were subsequently less likely to want to participate again.
Younger children, in contrast, were more likely to want to participate in
another study and considered this study to be more fun if they heard the explicit
debriefing than if they heard the positive debriefing.  This effect, however, is
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perhaps not a consequent of the debriefing protocol per se.  Children who heard
the explicit debriefing received a toy at the end of their participation, whereas
children who heard the positive debriefing received a blue ribbon.  For younger
children, the appeal of the toy may have overridden any other aspect of the
debriefing session, including the actual conversation.  Support for this conclusion
come from children’s open-ended responses to a question about what they learned
from the study.  Instead of stating something related to the content of the
debriefing, most children who heard the explicit debriefing simply replied that
they learned that it is okay to lose.
This research has implications for how developmentalists plan research
with children.  Specifically, this study suggests that deception is not necessarily
negative for children.  Future research should examine, however, whether
deception without any debriefing does have negative consequences.  Based on this
study, results suggest that the type of debriefing protocol researchers do intend to
use should perhaps be determined by the age of the child.  Older children
exhibited more negative reactions to the explicit debriefing than predicted.  At 9
to 10 years of age, they appeared to be old enough to understand the basic content
of the debriefing, but may not have been old enough to fully recognize the
necessity of the deception.  Future research should examine whether children in
early adolescence (12 –15 years of age) react more positively to the explicit
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debriefing.  Younger children, however, may have been more affected by the toy
given at the end of their participation than the actual protocol.  Future research
should attempt to disentangle this confound to assess whether children at 5 to 7
years of age remember the content of the explicit debriefing.
CONCLUSION
Although the past century of developmental psychology has increased our
understanding of children’s development, the unique experiences of children in
stigmatized groups has been largely ignored (although they account for more than
half of all children).  This is study was designed to address this gap in the
research.
As with all research, there are limitations to the present study.  For
example, because of ethical concerns, this study examined children’s perceptions
of discrimination in a domain that is relatively unimportant to children.  Future
research should examine the effects of discrimination in more important domains,
such as academics or peer relationships.  In addition, this study only examined
gender discrimination.  It will be important for future research to examine
perceptions of discrimination among children of racial and ethnic minority
groups.  Research has shown that children’s understanding of gender and race as
categories follow similar developmental trends.  Children’s knowledge of the
status of racial groups precedes, however, that of gender groups (see Bigler,
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Liben, & Krogh, 2002; Bigler, Averhart, & Liben, 2003), and thus, it is predicted
that children will perceive racial discrimination earlier than gender discrimination.
In addition, it is likely that several cognitive abilities affect how children
perceive discrimination and should be addressed.  For example, children’s views
about fairness and equity, and their moral reasoning, may be important to
examine.  Future research should also examine the effects of long-term exposure
to discrimination and the effects of such exposure on identity development, peer
relationships, academic performance, and mental health (e.g., anxiety and
depression).
Finally, caution should be taken in interpreting the findings in this
dissertation.  Because of the relatively small number of participants (and even
smaller number of participants who made an attribution to discrimination), and
because of the necessarily large number of statistical analyses, it is possible that
some of the findings are due to the particular children sampled.  Future research
should examine whether the generalizations made here are robust across other
samples of children.
Nonetheless, this study represents an important first step in understanding
the processes involved in children’s perceptions of discrimination.  Continued
research is likely to be useful for creating social and educational policies, and for
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designing intervention strategies to prevent and remedy perceptions of
discrimination among children.
88
FOOTNOTES
1 Research has found that children readily make social comparisons.  For
example, when given the option, 5-year-old children will compare their own work
with that of a competing peer (Ruble, Feldman, & Boggiano, 1976).  By 7 years
old, children use social comparisons more frequently and use that social
comparison information to alter their own behavior (e. g., to work more quickly).
Research has also shown that, by 7 years old, children use social comparison
information to assess their own ability and make inferences about task difficulty
(Ruble, Boggiano, Feldman, & Loebl, 1980).
2  There were six photographs available: a Euro-American boy and girl, a Hispanic
boy and girl, and an African American boy and girl.  Each photograph was rated
as average in attractiveness.
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APPENDIX A: PARENTAL CONSENT FORM
Title: Children’s Reactions to Drawing Ability Comparisons Across Peers
Investigator: Rebecca S. Bigler, Ph.D.
You and your child are invited to participate in a study about how children
react to comparisons with their peers and how childrearing factors influence
children's understanding of social groups.  My name is Rebecca Bigler and I am a
professor of child psychology at the University of Texas at Austin. I have been
studying children’s attitudes towards their peers and social relations for the last
fifteen years.  I am asking for your permission to include your child in a project
aimed at understanding children’s reactions to situations in which their drawing
abilities are compared across peers.  I am inviting all of the children enrolled in
the Boys' and Girls' Club to participate and I expect to have approximately 125
participants in the study.
If you agree to have your child participate, and if your child agrees as
well, your son or daughter will spend about fifteen minutes with me, or a graduate
student named Christia Spears Brown, on three occasions during the next three
weeks.  At the first meeting, children will be given a measure of their social
attitudes and a task that assesses a cognitive skill that develops during elementary
school called perspective taking.  Children generally find both of these tasks fun
and interesting.  At the second meeting, a Polaroid photograph will be taken of
each child and he or she will be asked to draw a picture of themselves, based on
the photo, for possible inclusion in a drawing exhibition.  Afterwards, children
will be told that their drawing was very good, but that they were not selected for
inclusion in the exhibition. Children will then complete measures of their
evaluation of their drawing skill and other traits, motivation and valuing drawing,
and perceived control over their environment. These meetings will be scheduled
by the Boys' and Girls' Club staff so that they do not interrupt children’s normal
activities.
After participation in the project, all children will be told that their
drawing was not actually judged for inclusion in a drawing exhibition.
Unfortunately, researchers know little about how researchers’ explanations affect
children’s feeling about their experience. In order to address this question, we also
plan to vary which aspect of our explanation is stressed.  For half of the
participants, we will stress that their drawing was excellent and that no children
were selected for the exhibition.  They will receive a blue ribbon for their
participation.  For the other half of the participants, we will stress that the drawing
90
exhibition was not real and that their experience in the study might help them to
empathize with their peers in similar situations.  One week later, we will meet
with your child one final, brief time to ask about their understanding, valuing, and
enjoyment of the experience of participating in this project.
In addition to your child's participation, we are also asking your
permission to send home a brief questionnaire for you to complete about some
topics you may discuss with your children.  We simply ask that, once completed,
you return it in the enclosed stamped envelope.
I hope you agree to have you and your child participate.  In the past, I have
found that children enjoy participating in activities of this kind.  I should note that
any information that is obtained in connection with this project and that can be
identified with your child is completely confidential.  We never disclose the
results of interviews or testing with individual children.  In the unlikely event that
we would ever want to do so, we certainly would do so only with your permission
and the permission of your child.  Upon completion of the study, your child's
photo and picture will be returned to your child to take home.  Your decision
whether or not to participate will not affect your future relations with The
University of Texas or Boys' and Girls' Club.  If you agree to have your child
participate, you are free to discontinue his/her participation at any time.  In
addition, your child is free to terminate his/her participation at any time. If you
have any questions, please feel free to contact me at (512) 471-9917. If you have
any additional questions later, I will be happy to answer them.
You are making a decision about allowing you and your child to
participate in this study. Your signature below indicates that you have read the
information provided above and have decided to allow him or her to participate in
the study. If you later decide that you wish to withdraw your permission for
yourself or your child to participate in the study, simply tell me. You may
discontinue participation at any time. You may keep the copy of this form.
_____________________________ ________________
Signature of Parent(s) or Legal Guardian Date
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APPENDIX B: THEORY OF MIND
I.  Show the two puppets. Say "This is Bob and this is Wendy.  They are playing a
game.  To play, they are told that they have to wait for a ring.  What do you think
they are waiting for?" Pause. "Well, Bob thinks he is waiting for this." Show
picture of phone.  Make sure child understand it.  "But Wendy thinks she is
waiting for this." Show picture of ring.  Make sure child understand it.
     
a. Why does Bob say it's one thing and at the same time Wendy say it's
another?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
b. Does it make sense for Wendy to say one thing and Bob to say
something else?
__________________________________________________________________
c. Why does it [doesn't it] make sense?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
d. Wendy says it's a diamond ring and Bob says it's a ringing phone.  Now
we will ask Spud what he thinks it is (Pull out third puppet).  Do you think Spud
will think it is a diamond ring or a ringing phone, or would you not know what he
would say?
__________________________________________________________________
e. If make a choice, ask How can you tell what he will think?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
If doesn't make a choice, ask Why is it hard to tell what he will think?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
II.  Lay out three cards with blocks on them, block side up. Say,  "In this game,
Bob and Wendy have to pick the card that is hiding the penny.  All they know is
that the penny is under the card with the big block."  Pause. "Well, Bob picked
the big red block.  But, Wendy picks the big blue block."
a. Why does Bob say it's one thing and at the same time Wendy say it's
another?
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__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
b. Does it make sense for Wendy to say one thing and Bob to say
something else?
__________________________________________________________________
c. Why does it [doesn't it] make sense?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
d. Wendy says it's under the blue block and Bob says it's under the red
block.  Now we will ask Spud what he thinks it is (Pull out third puppet).  Do you
think Spud will think it is under the blue block or under the red block, or would
you not know what he would say?
__________________________________________________________________
e. If make a choice, ask How can you tell what he will think?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
If doesn't make a choice, ask Why is it hard to tell what he will think?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
III.  "OK. Last one." Show picture of duck/rabbit.  "When Wendy looks at this
picture, she sees a duck." Point out the duck.  "But when Bob looks at the picture,
he sees a rabbit." Point out the rabbit.
a. Why does Bob say it's one thing and at the same time Wendy say it's
another?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
b. Does it make sense for Wendy to say one thing and Bob to say
something else?
__________________________________________________________________
c. Why does it [doesn't it] make sense?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
d. Wendy says it's a duck and Bob says it's a rabbit.  Now we will ask
Spud what he thinks it is (Pull out third puppet).  Do you think Spud will think it
is a duck or a rabbit, or would you not know what he would say?
_________________________________________________
e. If make a choice, ask How can you tell what he will think?
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__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
If doesn't make a choice, ask Why is it hard to tell what he will think?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX C: GENDER ATTITUDE SCALE (C-OAT)
Here is a list of activities that people can do.  We want you to tell us if you
think each activity should be done by boys, by girls, or by both boys and girls.
There are no right or wrong answers.  We just want to know who you think
should do these activities.
Who Should…
1.  fly a plane     only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
2.  iron clothes  only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
3.  sew from a pattern only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
4.  vacuum a house  only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
5.  go to the beach  only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
6.  go horseback riding only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
7.  wash clothes only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
9.  play cards only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
10.  play pool  only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
11.  set the table for dinner only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
12.  fix bicycles only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
13.  play darts only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
14.  do gymnastics only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
15.  play hide and seek only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
16.  babysit only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
17.  play video games only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
18.  draw buildings only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
19.  bake cookies only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
20.  sketch (or design)
       clothes only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
21.  grocery shop only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
22.  draw (or design) 
     cars/rockets only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
23. play basketball only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
24. build model airplanes only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
25.  do crossword puzzles only boys           only girls   both boys and girls
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APPENDIX D: SOCIAL AND PERFORMANCE
STATE SELF- ESTEEM SCALE
This is a questionnaire designed to measure what you are thinking at this moment.  There
is no right answer for any statement.  The best answer is what you feel is true of yourself
right now.  Please answer all of the items.
In the space next to each item, please write the number from the scale below which best
reflects your feelings:
1 2 3 4 5
                    not at all           a little bit          somewhat        very much        extremely
____I feel sure of my abilities. (P)
____I am worried about whether I am thought of as a good or bad. (S)
____I feel frustrated about my performance. (P)
____I feel I have trouble understanding things that I read. (P)
____I feel embarrassed. (S)
____I feel as smart as others. (P)
____I feel unhappy with myself. (S)
____I am worried about what other people think of me. (S)
____I feel sure that I understand things. (P)
____I feel not as good as others at this moment. (S)
____I feel concerned about what others think of me. (S)
____I feel that I am not as good at school right now than others. (P)
____I feel like I’m not doing well. (P)
____ I am worried about looking foolish. (S)
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APPENDIX E: MIIPC
Motivation, Identity, Importance, and
Social and Performance Perceived Control
1.  If you had the chance, how much would you want to draw your picture over
again for another chance in the contest?  ________  (M)
2.  How much is being a good drawer an important part of who you are?________
(ID)
3.  How important is it to be a good drawer? ________ (IM)
4.  How much do think you could improve on your drawing if you practiced a lot?
________ (PPC)
5.  If you met with the judge[s], how much do you think you would like each
other? ________  (SPC)
For the last three questions, just tell me how you agree with each sentence.
6.  If you drew your picture again and had the same judge[s], you would probably
be picked for the contest. ________ (PPC)
7.  If you drew your picture again and had a different judge[s], you would
probably be picked for the contest. ________ (PPC)
8.  If you met with your judge[s], you would probably get picked for the contest.
________ (SPC)
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APPENDIX F: DEBRIEFING
Debriefing Protocol
If the children is in the positive debriefing condition:
Tell the child, as you are looking at your papers, "Oh wait a minute.  This
isn't right.  I that think we made a mistake.  I need to go double-check something.
I'll be right back."  Leave the room for one minute.  While gone, pick up a blue
ribbon.  Keep hidden in folder until right time.
Upon returning, tell the child, "You know what?  I made a big mistake.  I
must have picked up the wrong picture by accident.  Your drawing was actually
picked as one of the best ones.  I am so sorry.  In fact, your drawing is so good,
we are going to display it next year at the University of Texas in a special
display."
Say while pulling out the blue ribbon from the folder, "In fact, we actually
have a blue ribbon to give to you to show you how much we liked your drawing.
You actually won our 'Blue Ribbon Artist Award.'  I am so sorry about the mix-
up."
Make sure the children feel positively about their drawings.  Finally, say
to the children "Because other kids haven't had their turn to draw yet, and because
they may not win a ribbon, it is very important that you don't talk about the
study with anyone.  Can you promise not to mention it to the other kids?  It is
very important."  Make sure children agree not to mention it to anyone.
[Purpose: Help child feel good about drawing]
If the children is in the explicit debriefing condition:
First, ask children, "What did you think about our contest?  Did you think
anything was funny about it?"  [Purpose: To see if the child was suspicious about
the manipulation.]
If child says "Yes," follow-up and ask "What did you think wasn't quite
right?"  If child guesses true nature of study, ask when they began to think that.
Also, use your own judgment to decide whether (a) they really guessed at the
beginning of the study, and thus all of their data may be suspect or (b) they only
guessed at the end when you asked them about it, and thus, when answering their
questions, they really did believe the cover story.  Mark all of this on their folders.
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If child guessed true nature of study, say "You are very smart.  We tried to make
our contest as believable as possible."
If the child says "No," say "That is good.  We worked really hard to make
sure nothing seemed funny about our contest." "But really, something was funny
about our contest.  In fact, there really isn't an art contest."
Regardless of what child says, tell all children, "Let me tell you what our
contest was really about.  First of all, there really wasn't a drawing contest after
all.  We actually made that up.  There really wasn't a judge, either.  I just said
your picture wasn't picked by the judge, but that wasn't true.  In fact, this picture
here of the judge (show picture) is really a picture of a friend of mine.  He [she] is
not really a judge.  Also, these picture of other kids (show pictures) are not really
past winners; they are just pictures of regular kids.  There wasn't a contest at all.
I'm sure if there was a contest, your picture would have been picked."
"Well, does it seem like it wasn't very nice of us to make up this contest?
Let me tell you why we did it.  It is for a very  important reason.  All of this is
actually for a research study we are doing.  Have you ever been in a research
study before? Well, for this study, we are wanting to know how kids understand
discrimination."
"Do you know what discrimination is?  Discrimination is when people get
treated unfairly or don't get picked for something just because they are a boy or a
girl or have different color skin or are handicapped.  There are a lot of people in
the world who face discrimination.  Like, sometimes girls don't get to play on
sports teams just because they are girls.  Or daddies don't get to stay home and
take care of their new babies like the mommies do just because they are boys.  Or
African-Americans don't get a job they want because they are not white.  Can you
think of an example of someone who got treated unfairly because of what they
look like?"  (Let them think of an example).  "Do you think that someone who is
in a wheelchair might be discriminated against? How?"  (Let think of an
example.)
"Well, because we think discrimination is so bad, we want to stop it.  That
is a pretty important thing, don't you think?  Well, before we can do that, we have
to understand what people know about discrimination.  And since I want to know
what stuff kids think about, I wanted to find out what kids thought about
discrimination."
"That is why we had the fake contest.  We wanted to put kids in a situation
in which they didn't get picked for something.  Did you think that you didn't get
picked because you were a girl [boy]?  Well, had you really been in a contest, and
really not been picked just because you were a girl [boy], then that would be
discrimination.  Because it is unfair not to get picked just because you are a girl
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[boy].  Don't you agree?  That is why I asked you so many questions after the fake
contest.  I wanted to see what you thought about not getting picked."
"So you see, you helped us better understand what kids think about
discrimination.  Your helping us will help us stop this happening in real life.  Can
you see how important your help is? So do you understand why we made up the
contest? "
"Well, how did it feel when you weren't selected? Did it feel bad? (Here is
where you need to use your best judgeent.  If kid really felt bad, spend a lot of
time on this.  If the kid didn't care, you can go faster.)   Most kids say that they
felt kind of bad after we told them they didn't get picked.  They felt like they
weren't good drawers."
"In fact, even after we explained that we made up the contest and the
judging, some kids say that they still feel bad about their drawing.  So we want
you to remember that the judging was made up, and remember that the study had
nothing to do with your actual drawing ability.  In fact, you are a very good
drawer."  Make sure kid feels okay about drawing.
"One last thing.  This is super important.  Because other kids haven't had
their turn in the study yet, and because if someone knew what the study was about
it would ruin it, it is very important that you don't talk about the study with any
of the other kids.  Can you promise not to mention it to the other kids?  It is very
important."  Make sure children agree not to mention it to anyone.
"To thank you for being such an important helper in our study, we want
you to pick out something from the yellow box."
[Purpose: Help the child understand the study, and better understand
discrimination in general].
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Debriefing Questions
Please answer the questions as best as you can.  There are NO right or wrong answers.  They are just your
opinions.
(SHOW CUPS).  Let's use the cup scale.  (IF needed, review the scale.)
________1. How much did you like being in our study [contest]?
________2. How much would you want to be in another study [contest] like ours?
________3. How much did you think our study [contest] was unfair or not nice?
________4. How much did you think our study [contest] was fun?
________5. How much did you learn from our study [contest]?
________6. How much do you think our study [contest] will help other kids?
________7. How good do you think you are at drawing?
________8. How much do you like being a girl [boy]?
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APPENDIX G: SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES
THEORY OF MIND AS PREDICTOR OF OTHER ATTRIBUTIONS
To assess whether children’s theory of mind development predicted
children’s open-ended attributions to the other possible attributions, independent
of age, interpretive theory of mind scores were entered into a logistic regression
model (following age in months).  Separate logistic regression models were
analyzed, using whether or not children made an attribution to ability, effort,
quality, and “don’t know” as the dependent variables.  Separate analyses were
conducted for children who were given situational information suggesting that
discrimination was likely and children given situational information suggesting
that discrimination was unlikely.  Entering this variable as a predictor in the
model would have substantially reduced power.  Results indicated that, for
children who heard situational information suggesting likely discrimination,
theory of mind development did predict, independent of age, whether or not
children made an attribution to differences in quality as the reason why they were
not picked (eb  = .48; Wald = 3.92, p < .05).  In other words, children with more
advanced understanding of theory of mind were less likely to make an open-ended
attribution to quality when they heard likely discrimination than children with less
advanced understanding of theory of mind.
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Interestingly, results also indicated that, for children who heard situational
information suggesting likely discrimination, theory of mind development
moderately predicted, independent of age, whether or not children said “don’t
know” when asked why they were not picked (eb  = 1.95; Wald = 3.53, p = .06).
That is, children with more advanced understanding of theory of mind were more
likely to say “I don’t know” when asked to make an attribution after hearing
likely discrimination than children with less advanced understanding of theory of
mind.  Neither interpretive theory of mind development nor age significantly
predicted children’s attributions whether they heard situational information
suggesting that discrimination was unlikely.
To assess whether age and theory of mind development predicted
children’s ratings of the other possible experimenter-provided attributions,
separate hierarchical multiple regression models using children’s mean responses
to the veracity of ability, effort, quality, and unfairness as the dependent variables
were analyzed.  Results indicated that, because of the high correlation between
theory of mind and age, neither theory of mind nor age accounted for a significant
amount of unique variance in children’s ratings of the veracity of effort and
unfairness.  However, when entered separately, age and theory of mind predicted
children’s ratings of effort (age: b  = -.35; t = -2.69, p < .05 and theory of mind: b
= -.39; t = -2.96, p < .005) and unfairness (age: b  = -.42; t = -3.31, p < .005 and
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theory of mind: b  = -.40; t = -3.09, p < .005).  In a similar manner to children’s
ratings of discrimination, children with more advanced understanding of theory of
mind (and older children) rated both unfairness and differences in effort as less
accurate explanations than children with less advanced understanding of theory of
mind (and younger children).
CONSEQUENCES OF OTHER ATTRIBUTIONS
Correlations between children’s ratings of the veracity of the
experimenter-provided attributions and the outcome variables were examined for
children who heard situational information suggesting that discrimination was
likely.
Of the children who experienced negative feedback that was likely
discrimination, children who rated differences in effort as a more accurate
explanation for their feedback showed decreased performance self-esteem, r = -
.49(e.g., they were more likely to say that they were concerned with how well
they were doing); increased performance and social perceived control, r = .47 and
.37, respectively (e.g., they were more likely to say that, if they were either able to
draw their picture again or meet with the judges, they would be chosen for the
contest); increased ratings of the importance of drawing as a skill, r = .38; and
increased ratings of the importance of drawing to who they are, r = .39.  Those
children who rated differences in ability as a more accurate explanation for their
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feedback showed increased social perceived control, r = .40 (e.g., they were more
likely to say that, if they were able to meet with the judge, they would be chosen
for the contest).  Finally, of the children who experienced negative feedback that
was likely discrimination, those children who rated general unfairness of the
contest as a more accurate explanation for their feedback showed decreased social
self-esteem, r = -.38 (e.g., they were more likely to say that they were concerned
about what others thought of them); increased performance perceived control, r =
.55 (e.g., they were more likely to say that, if they were able to draw their picture
again, they would be chosen for the contest); and increased ratings of the
importance of drawing as a skill, r = .60.
DEBRIEFING METHODOLOGIES
Analyses were also conducted to examine whether the effects of
debriefing protocols differed based on whether children experienced negative
feedback that was either likely or unlikely discrimination.  Specifically, a 2
(debriefing: explicit debriefing or positive feedback) X 2 (situational information:
likely or unlikely) MANOVA was conducted, with children’s responses to the
follow-up questions as the dependent variables.
Results indicated that the main effect for debriefing condition was
significant for how much children considered the study to be helpful to others, F
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(1, 29) = 5.40, p < .05.  Children who heard the explicit debriefing considered the
study more helpful to others than children who heard the positive debriefing.
The interaction between debriefing condition and situational information
was significant for how much children enjoyed the study, F (1, 29) = 5.15, p <
.05.  Post hoc analyses indicated that, among children who experienced negative
feedback that was unlikely discrimination, they considered their participation
more enjoyable if they heard the positive debriefing (M = 4.00; SD = .00) than if
they heard the explicit debriefing (M = 3.50; SD = .76).  Children who
experienced negative feedback that was likely discrimination did not differ in
their responses based on the debriefing protocol they heard.
The interaction between debriefing condition and situational information
was marginally significant for how unfair children considered the study to be, F
(1, 29) = 3.15, p = .08.  Post hoc analyses indicated that, among children who
experienced negative feedback that was unlikely discrimination, they considered
the study more unfair if they heard the positive debriefing (M = 1.57; SD = 1.9)
than if they heard the explicit debriefing (M = .75; SD = 1.4).  In contrast, among
children who experienced negative feedback that was likely discrimination, they
considered the study more unfair if they heard the explicit debriefing (M = 1.37;
SD = 1.9) than if they heard the positive debriefing (M = .30; SD = .68).
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